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Abstract 
 
This paper asks how strong African Public Financial Management (PFM) has 
become, after a decade and more of reform. How well do African PFM systems in 
place now facilitate effective public financial management? Where are the next 
challenges and how can they be met? It analyzes recent PFM assessments in 31 
governments to answer these questions, identifying patterns of strengths and 
weaknesses across the PFM system and across countries. In respect of the former, the 
study finds that budgets are made better than they are executed, practice lags behind 
the creation of processes and laws, and processes are stronger where concentrated 
actors are engaged. In respect of the latter, the study finds that different countries fall 
into different ‘PFM performance leagues’ and countries in the different leagues look 
very different to each other. A range of factors influence which league a country is 
associated with; including economic growth, stability, reform tenure and colonial 
heritage. On the basis of this evidence, the paper argues that existing reforms face 
limits that can only be overcome with adjustments in reform approach; with less 
focus on pushing reform technicalities and more on creating ‘space’ in which reform 
takes place, less concentration of engagements with small sets of actors and more on 
expanding engagements, and less emphasis on reproducing the same reform models 
and more on better understanding what context-appropriate reforms look like.   iii
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Executive Summary 
 
1.  How strong has African PFM become? How do African public financial 
management (PFM) systems in place now facilitate effective public financial 
management? Where are the next challenges and how can they be met? This paper 
intends to inform those trying to answer such questions by identifying central themes 
of the continent’s recent PFM story. The themes are also used to promote a 
conversation about the role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in African PFM: 
How much have CSOs been a part of the main story lines to date? Where could they 
occupy the story more in future? 
2.  Themes arise from the analysis of recent quantitative and qualitative data on 
PFM system characteristics and reform initiatives in 31 African governments. The 
quantitative data comes from studies of country systems using the PEFA 
methodology, which evaluates systems on over 70 dimensions; each dimension 
receives an A to D score (equating with 1-4). The qualitative materials include 
performance reports used to explain the evidence behind each score. Themes emerge 
in three main parts focused first on a stock taking exercise aimed at identifying (i) 
themes across PFM processes, and (ii) themes across countries. This stock-taking is 
followed by a strategic analysis focused on themes emerging from past reforms and a 
discussion of current and future reform challenges in African PFM. 
A.    Taking stock 1: Themes across PFM process areas 
3.  Three themes are identified across the process areas in African PFM systems: 
(i) Budgets are made better than they are executed; (ii) Practice lags behind the 
creation of processes and laws; and (iii) Actor concentration pays: 
•  The first theme relates the observation that budget preparation processes are 
comparatively stronger than budget execution and oversight processes across all 
African countries. In PFM jargon, this is commonly presented as ‘upstream 
processes are stronger than downstream processes’.  
•  The second theme is more nuanced, showing across all process areas that African 
PFM systems generally suffer from an implementation deficit—laws and 
processes may be in place but seldom affect actual behavior. The theme reflects a 
new institutional differentiation between de jure and de facto reform and is shown 
in the words of one recent diagnostic, “Legislation and procedures have been 
improved … [but] implementation has not yet been achieved.”  
•  The third theme offers even more specificity, suggesting that processes are 
stronger when narrower, concentrated sets of actors are involved in 
implementation. Processes are weaker where they involve multiple players, 
especially outside of central PFM entities like the budget department or treasury. 
4.  These themes all emerge as significant in a statistical sense and from written 
descriptions of experience. They are bought together in Figure E1, which shows the 
average scores for different PEFA dimensions according to the thematic 
classification. The weakest dimension types, averaging 1.9 out of 4 over all 31 
countries and shown in the solid black bar at the top of the figure, are downstream   2
(budget execution and oversight), practice oriented (de-facto), and involving de-
concentrated sets of actors. The strongest dimension types, averaging more than 2.5 
and shown in the clear bar at the foot of the figure, are upstream (budget preparation), 
process oriented (or de-jure) and involving concentrated actor sets.    
Fig. E1. Different strengths of different process types, by theme 
1.8 2.05 2.3 2.55
Average score (min=1, max=4)
Upstream, process, concentrated Upstream, process, de-concentrated
Downstream, practice, concentrated Upstream, practice, concentrated
Downstream, process, concentrated Downstream, process, de-concentrated
Upstream, practice, de-concentrated Downstream, practice, de-concentrated
 
   
B.    Taking stock 2: Themes across countries 
5.  Figure E1 captures general differences in dimension strengths, paying no 
regard to inter-country difference in the process. Substantial variation exists in 
dimension strength across countries as well, however. The variation is significant 
enough to suggest that different countries fall into different ‘PFM performance 
leagues’. These leagues are identified empirically, based on PEFA scores, and in the 
contrasting written descriptions of country performance. They are shown in Figures 
E2 and E3, which illustrate how countries in top leagues (4 and 5 at the right) have 
stronger processes and outcomes than those in lower leagues (1, 2 and 3 at the left). 
Fig. E2. PFM process strength differs by performance league 
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Figure E3. PFM outcomes also differ by league 
1
2
3
4
012345
Leagues (1 to 5)
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
s
c
o
r
e
 
(
o
u
t
 
o
f
 
4
)
outcomes  
6.  The evidence shows that countries in the different leagues look very different 
to each other. Lower league countries have weak dimensions no matter how these are 
categorized; de jure and de facto are weak, as are concentrated and de-concentrated 
dimensions, as are upstream and downstream. League 3 countries share weak 
downstream, de facto and de-concentrated dimensions with lower league countries; 
but league 3 countries are strengthening PFM dimensions that are in the upstream, de 
jure in nature, and centered on the engagement of concentrated actor sets. League 5 
countries share strengthened upstream, de jure and concentrated PFM areas with 
league 3; but these countries appear to be strengthening the other dimensions—
downstream, de facto and de-concentrated. These are their current challenges. 
7.  Themes also arise in explaining why countries fall into different leagues. A 
range of factors are seen to influence the quality of PFM systems and outcomes, 
presented as five major themes:  
•  Growing economies have stronger PFM. 
•  Stability delivers PFM progress, although there may be a peculiar ‘starting 
from scratch’ dividend for countries enjoying post conflict stability. 
•  States with larger domestic, non-mineral income sources have stronger PFM. 
•  Longer periods of broad reform commitment foster PFM progress. And, 
•  Colonial heritage matters (maybe).  
8.  These themes are all presented on the basis of quantitative and qualitative 
evidence. They are not explained (and indeed various explanations could be offered, 
implying different directions of causality for example). It is apparent that the thematic 
influences interlink, however, and that there may be an as yet unidentified factor 
underlying them all—Higher growth states might raise more domestic revenues than 
others, have more political stability and have more space for reform, for example. 
This is the basic message behind Figure E4, which shows which countries have the 
‘positive’ aspect of the four themes, organized from weakest to strongest PFM 
performance (league 1 through league 5). (Some countries are denoted as a number, 
reflecting confidentiality of these PEFA assessments.) The higher bars on the right 
reflect more ‘positives’ in place, apparently facilitating PFM reform and reform   4
space, and ultimately better PFM performance. These countries are mostly in league 
5, which also has higher PFM system quality and outcomes. 
 
Fig. E4. Country characteristics combine to impede, facilitate PFM across leagues 
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9.  The strongest message from this section is simply that country characteristics 
matter a great deal in understanding what PFM system quality looks like. Some 
countries are substantially ahead of others in a general sense because they fall on the 
positive side of all the themes identified. They are in Africa’s top leagues, climbing 
rungs at the very top of the PFM performance ladder. Other countries find themselves 
struggling with contextual realities that put them on the negative side of the themes 
discussed. Their PFM processes and outcomes are weak, and they are in the bottom 
leagues, struggling to get past the lower rungs of the PFM performance ladder. These 
observations, and the themes underlying them, raise important questions for 
reformers, chief among these being, “Is context taken seriously in reform design?” 
C.    Strategy: Themes from past reforms, thoughts for the future 
10.  The final section addresses this and other questions pertaining to PFM reform 
experience across Africa. The main theme centers on the apparent similarities in 
reform models across the 31 countries. The theme is reflected in the observation that 
similarities belie country differences. The ‘similar’ model is composed of a set of 
international reform ‘products’ and follows a common modality of engagement, 
whereby central, concentrated entities like treasuries, budget departments and even 
revenue and procurement agencies are strengthened and laws and processes are 
modified. This reform approach is seen to deliver better law and stronger central 
agencies, but may be limited to these gains only. 
11.  This reform approach lends itself to identifying ‘low hanging fruit’ options for 
lower league countries, especially those in league 3. These options tend to be in PFM 
dimensions that are upstream, de jure and involving concentrated players, visible to 
donors and potential investors. League 3 countries stand a good chance of achieving   5
reform success in these dimensions because they are building on foundations already 
developed. Other ‘higher hanging fruit’ options for league 3 are in downstream, de 
facto and de-concentrated player dimensions, where the foundations are weaker, and 
the reform approach less suited.  
12.  Given this discussion, and drawing from the new institutional theory about 
isomorphic change, the paper suggests that the existing reform approach may have 
successfully delivered strong laws and central agencies to date but is less well suited 
to looming challenges with other dimensions. In higher league countries these 
challenges involve a need for de-facto implementation by de-concentrated entities, 
which have to date fallen out of the ‘reach’ of reforms. In lower league countries the 
deleterious effect of challenging contexts yields static, externally imposed models 
unsuitable for replication. The paper proposes adjustments needed to meet looming 
challenges embodied in calls for: 
•  less focus on technicalities, more on ‘space’ 
•  less concentration and more coverage, and 
•  less similarity, more context-appropriateness. 
D.    CSOs and PFM in Africa 
13.  The paper consistently explores the existing and potential role of CSOs in 
Africa’s PFM story, in context of the ‘gaps’ implied in themes. There are 
considerable findings:  
•  CSOs already engage as external watchdogs and partners in shoring up 
capacity for reporting and fostering transparency.  
•  CSOs are also engaged in situations where laws allow and even require 
practices that governments are not acting on.  
•  The lack of PFM reach to de-concentrated entities also plays into CSO 
strengths to convene across organizational bridges.  
14.  Even with these opportunities, CSOs face their own challenges in engagement 
and serious questions about whether they have the ‘right stuff’ for engagement. Do 
CSOs have the ability to choose appropriate roles for different settings, for example, 
working as partners in some instances, introducing new ideas in others, and 
occupying adversarial corners in others? It is vital that CSOs not become agents of 
one-best-way models of engagement, reflective of PFM reform modalities. CSOs 
could play a role challenging these reform modalities, contributing to creative space, 
facilitating greater reach, and helping to shape interventions to context. CSOs need 
legitimacy to do this, reflected most basically in having their own financial 
management ‘house in order’. If CSOs do not have this kind of ‘right stuff’ they will 
be marginalized in the PFM story. CSO roles in this regard are also dependent on 
opportunities in the PFM system itself: if basic PFM information is unavailable to 
professional associations, business groups and such, these CSOs have few 
instruments to have an impact. Right now CSOs seem to have lots of access to 
information about upstream, de jure processes but still face a black box when it 
comes to downstream, de facto PFM issues, severely limiting their potential to 
engage.   6
I.  Examining PFM systems in Africa 
 
15.  Recent papers cite the ubiquitous nature of public sector reform in the 
developing world. The World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) cites 
particularly high engagement in the last ten years. This period has seen increased 
lending to such initiatives by organizations like the World Bank, with governance and 
public sector reform leading many country assistance strategies. Wescott notes 
similarly in regard to public financial management (PFM), “a sharp increase in 
[World Bank] PFM diagnostic work and lending since 2000.”
2 What has this work 
achieved? What does past experience suggest for future reform? What, in particular, 
can we learn about the potential role of Civil Society Organization’s in PFM? 
16.  These are the questions underlying the current research, which aims to 
identify themes emerging from efforts to improve PFM systems in Africa.  The 
themes were identified through comparative analysis of PFM characteristics and 
experience in a sample of African countries. The analysis was predominantly based 
on statistical manipulation of quantitative data emerging from 31 recent PEFA PFM 
performance assessments. This analysis was supplemented by the review of 
documentary discussions of the same systems and countries (PFM-PRs). Qualitative 
examination of these documents, using content analysis, allows triangulation of 
evidence to enhance the validity of themes.  
A.    The quantitative/qualitative approach 
17.  The PEFA Public Financial Management Performance Measurement 
Framework allows assessment of PFM system quality in respect of 31 indicators, 
most ‘scored’ with reference to multiple dimensions. 73 independently assessed 
dimensions constitute the full PEFA framework, with each dimension assessed on a 
four point ordinal scale from A to D, against detailed criteria that require evidence-
based argument. In enumerating PEFA’s ordinal symbols, the current research looks 
with interest at which dimensions scored 4 (A), 3 (B), 2 (C) and 1 (D) based on the 
idea that the higher the score, the more like “international good practice”.
3 Table 1 
lists the 31 countries in the sample. Readers will identify a good mix of Anglophone, 
Francophone and Lusophone countries and of income per capita levels in the group.  
Table 1. Countries in the PEFA dataset, in African and Non-African group 
Group (and 
size) 
Country (African group) and Regional Representation (Non-African group) 
 
African (31) 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Democratic republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Siera Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia  
                                                 
2 Wescott, C.G. (2008) “World Bank Support for Public Financial Management: Conceptual Roots and 
Evidence of Impact” World Bank Independent Evaluation Working Group Working Paper. Washington 
D.C.: World Bank. 
3 Based on the convention developed in de Renzio, P. (2008) “Taking Stock: What Do PEFA Assessments 
Tell Us About PFM Systems Across Countries?” Unpublished manuscript, The PEFA Secretariat, p.6. 
   7
 
 
18.  The legitimacy of the PEFA data is partly reflected in recent research findings 
that, “The PEFA instrument itself appears to be valued by both governments and 
development partners.”
4 Quality is enhanced by the PEFA Secretariat’s own controls 
which include the tight, evidence-based criteria, oversight in most assessment 
processes, and the requirement that all analyses be supplemented with a PFM 
Performance Report (PFM-PR) in which experts involved must provide evidence 
supporting scores. The Secretariat also conducts its own reviews of assessments, in 
which it identifies possible quality concerns. Their 2007 report indicated issues 
amenable to different solutions, which have been considered in the current study:
5 
•  Concerns that are difficult to treat relate to the date of PEFA assessment and the 
way it was produced. These issues are acknowledged at various points in this text, 
especially noting where the readers (at least two) agreed on specific problems in 
earlier studies (produced before 2006) and those studies conceived in difficult 
circumstances (where noted in the PFM-PR).  
•  Issues that are easier to address include some concerns about compliance with 
criteria and missing scores, particularly regarding specific indicators and 
dimensions. These concerns are mostly addressed through checks of all the PEFA 
scores against PFM-PR descriptions and PEFA criteria. Missing scores were all 
identified independently and careful checks against PFM-PR descriptions (by at 
least two readers in each case) allowed identification of cases where the missing 
score reflected a complete lack of information (where the score was left missing) 
or where the description suggested lower than a D (where D was assigned).
6 
•  Some concerns over compliance are harder to address, especially related to 
systematic problems with interpretation. The PEFA Secretariat notes some areas 
subject to this problem, including internal and external audit. Differences in 
interpretation arise for a variety of reasons, including different colonial heritage; 
there are accounts of Francophone governments disagreeing with the PEFA 
approach to external audit, for example. These concerns are considered in 
interpreting the data, and discussed explicitly in the text. 
•  Questions about weighting the dimensions have also been raised. The PEFA 
Secretariat was particularly concerned about weighting where the 73 dimensions 
were used as individual data points, given that some of the 31 PEFA indicators 
(like PI-23 on reporting of revenues at service delivery points) have only one 
dimension, whereas others have many (like PI-12, which looks at strategic 
budgeting and has four dimensions). We gave all dimensions equal weighting, 
having no theoretical reason to do otherwise. We did not feel that the multiple 
dimensions in indicator areas duplicated each other: In PI-12, for example, there 
                                                 
4 Betley, M. (2008). “Assessing Impact of the PEFA Framework” Manuscript produced for PEFA Steering 
Committee, available at: www.pefa.org, p.34. 
5 PEFA (2008) “PFM Performance Measurement Framework Monitoring Report 2007” www.pefa.org. 
6Such checks allowed adjustment of 97 scores (to ensure descriptions reflected criteria) and identification 
of some missing dimension. 85 missing scores were impossible to identify because no information was 
provided in the PFM-PR. This amounts to 3.7% of the total number of indicator scores (2294).   8
19.  Quality control considerations like those noted above enhance validity and 
reliability of the PEFA scores and their use in the current study. The most important 
control is the standardized criterion used for assessment. Tight criteria mean that 
similar scores in different assessments refer to similar general PFM characteristics.
7 
The dimensions are also well suited to identifying themes and patterns, which one 
expects to be more vivid over larger data sets. To allow easy theme identification, the 
dimensions are at times organized into clusters reflecting PFM process areas. These 
build on the ‘budget cycle’ categories in the PEFA framework, locating dimensions in 
18 process areas shown in Figure 1. Dimensions are aggregated at times into ‘process 
indexes’ reflecting each cluster, all of which enjoy acceptable levels of internal 
consistency. The first few PEFA indicators are not included as they reflect outcomes.  
Fig. 1. Clustering the PEFA dimensions 
 
 
National and Sectoral Policy 
Review and Development 
Process
1. Strategic Budgeting
(policy-budget connection, resource 
envelope, ceilings)
2. Budget Preparation
3. Resource Management
Financial resources (revenue, 
customs, debt, cash), procurement, 
personnel and capital management
4. Internal Controls, 
Internal Audit and 
Monitoring  
5. Accounting and 
Reporting
6. External Audit and 
Accountability
PEM System
Budget Preparation 
11.i, 11.ii, 11.iii, 5, 6, 8.i, 8.ii, 10, D2.i 
Legislative Budget Deliberation 
27.i, 27.ii, 27.iii, 27.iv, 11.iii 
Strategic Budgeting 
12.i, 12.ii, 12.iii, 12.iv 
Resource Management 
Inflows (Taxes) 13.i, 13.ii, 13.iii, 14.i, 14.ii, 
14.iii, 15.i, 15.ii, 15.iii (Debt) 17.i, 17.ii 
(Donors) D1.i, D1.ii, D2.i, D2.ii, D3 
Outflows (Cash) 16.i, 16.ii, 16.iii, 27.iv, 17.i, 
20.i, 5, D1.ii  (Procurement) 19.i, 19.ii, 19.iii 
(HR/Payroll) 18.i, 18.ii, 18.iii, 18.iv 
Internal control, audit and 
monitoring 
Internal controls 20.i, 20.ii, 20.iii 
Internal audit 21.i, 21.ii, 21.iii 
Monitoring 4.i, 9.i, 9.ii 
PFM System 
Accounting and reporting  
Accounts reconciliation 22.i, 22.ii 
In-year-reporting 24.i, 24.ii, 24.iii 
Annual reporting 25.i, 25.ii, 25.iii 
Special reporting 4.ii, 7.i, 7.ii, 8.iii, 
9.i, 9.ii, 10, 23 
External accountability 
External audit 26.i, 26.ii, 26.iii 
Legislative audit analysis 28.i, 28.ii, 
28.iii 
  Source: Andrews (2007)
8 
 
                                                 
7 Even though the detailed characteristics and reasons for weakness might differ, a point made explicit in 
Dorotinsky’s recent comment on the IMF’s PFM blog (August 4, 2008, http://blog-pfm.imf.org/): “The 
indicators provide an over-view of performance, but would not necessarily provide the reasons why 
performance was weak (one would know why the score was assessed at a 'c', for example, but not perhaps 
whether this was due to human capital, IT systems, management, legislation or policy).” 
8 Andrews, M. 2007. “What would an ideal PFM system look like?” in Shah, A. (ed). Budgeting and 
Budgetary Institutions. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 359-383. Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/BudgetingandBudgetaryInstitutions.pdf 
See also the description at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/383606-
1119904390686/bbl121905_background.pdf   9
 
 
20.  The PEFA data is well suited to the task of identifying general PFM themes 
across the 18 process areas listed in Figure 1. As already noted, its value is enhanced 
by the ability to check scores against written descriptions in PFM-PR documents. 
These documents and other recently written diagnostic pieces also accommodate a 
stronger, triangulated research design. Triangulation in this case involves looking for 
themes through multiple evidence types, sources and methods of analysis. Building 
on Webb et al., the idea is simply that, “Once a proposition [or theme] has been 
confirmed by two or more independent measurement processes, the uncertainty of its 
interpretation is greatly reduced.”
9  
21.  In the spirit of triangulation, therefore, documentary evidence was analyzed to 
support themes identified in the quantitative work, accommodating greater certainty 
about the themes that are identified. The documents produced in concert with the 
PEFA data are the main sources. These are called different names with only some 
officially termed Public Financial Management Performance Reports (PFM-PRs). For 
the sake of reference, however, they are termed PFM-PRs when referred to here. 
Other World Bank publications are also referenced, including Public Expenditure 
Reviews (PERs), Country Financial Accountability Assessments (CFAAs) and Public 
Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Reports (PEMFARs).
10 One 
should note that all of these documents were endorsed and often co-written by other 
donor groups as well as government entities (notably Ministries of Finance). Their 
legitimacy is thus broader than their published status as World Bank documents. 
There were some confidentiality issues to consider in using these documents (hence 
some countries are shown by number and not name) and translation concerns did 
make the content analysis complex in places. 
B.    An early story line 
22.  The search for a story-line begins with Figure 2, which compares the average 
African score on each PEFA dimension with the average score in the 42 non-African 
countries, and three other ‘performance levels’—the “international good practice” 4 
score (an A), 3 (a B) and 2 (a C). It shows that African averages are mostly below 
“international good practice” and mostly lag other countries (in more than 60 % of 
dimension scores).
11  African averages generally fall between 2 and 3 scores (57 % of 
dimensions). Why does Africa lag behind other countries? Is “international good 
practice” an appropriate benchmark? 
 
Fig.2. Benchmarking African PFM; climbing the PFM performance ladder? 
                                                 
9 Webb, E. J., D. T. Campbell, R. D. Schwartz and L. Sechrest (1966) Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive 
Research in the Social Sciences. New York: Rand McNally. 
10 Other documents related to projects affecting PFM, accounting ROSCs and PRSP-related documents, 
which leads to referencing IMF updates as well. 
11 In 60 of 73 dimensions.   10
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23.  Answers to the questions suggest the importance of context in understanding 
PEFA scores. African scores lag the other group on the PEFA dimensions and income 
per capita measures, with the latter being a notable and significant determinant of 
PEFA performance. Country wealth, or development status, is also a major predictor 
on attainment of the “international good practice” score (4). Countries with income 
per capita exceeding $4,000 are more than twice as likely to score a 4 over the entire 
set of dimensions.
12  There are obviously many explanations of this,
13 but attaining 
“good international practice” does seem strongly akin to reaching the top rungs of the 
development ladder. (Even though country context suggests the 4 scores may not 
always represent replicable good practice: Norway defends some sub-4 PEFA scores 
as appropriate to its context, for example.
14)  
24.  Given the apparent correlation between PEFA scores and level of 
development, Figure 2 proposes potential ‘developmental’ benchmarks for the 
African group. The 2 and 3 scores equate with C and B symbols and appear as second 
and third rungs on the short ladder to the ultimate 4. These are useful comparisons for 
countries still climbing the ladder. They imply the 4 score as a generally worthy end 
goal, not necessarily a hard “good practice”, and allow perspective on country 
progress towards the top rungs. Assessed against these two ladder benchmarks, the 
African group can best be described by words in Uganda’s most recent report: “Still 
in progress and yet to achieve the desired level of success.” The description reflects 
these total numbers: 35 % of African PEFA dimension scores (800) suggest PFM 
process and practice areas are still on the bottom run of the ladder (a 1 or D); 29 % 
                                                 
12 The eight countries in this category make up 10 % of the sample but account for 22.5% of the 4 scores. These 
countries record 25 “good practice” 4’s on average, higher than the 10.5 average for other countries.  
13 The work here does not suggest causality in the relationship, for example: It is possible that wealthier 
economies create conditions for stronger PFM, or that a commitment to strong PFM fosters progress 
towards wealth accumulation. 
14 Norway’s PEFA assessment is available at http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=12361. The 
response to this is presented at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/25/41084040.ppt#275,7,Conclusions. This 
presentation argues that C and D scores on dimensions including medium term budgeting, internal audit 
and decentralized public financial management may reflect Norwegian context and not a need for change.   11
(669) are on the second rung up (2 or C); 20 % (445) are on the third rung up (3 or 
B); and 12.3 % (284) are at the top (4 or A).  
25.  The picture is also of a continent with variation in experience, which Figure 2 
shows nicely across the 73 PEFA dimensions. Why do African means on some PEFA 
dimensions, and thus PFM practices, place the continent at the bottom rung (on 
average) while showing it on the third rung for others?  This variation is not only 
shown in mean scores across PFM dimensions, however, but also in variation within 
the dimensions. Figure 3 illustrates this, showing both the mean and standard 
deviation for the African group in regard to all dimensions. Why do scores vary 
within dimensions, and why is there inter country variation reflected in standard 
deviations above 0.7 in all cases? 
Fig.3. Noting variation in African PEFA PFM dimension scores 
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26.  The picture of variation across Africa suggests two primary PFM theme types, 
which are discussed as the basis of a stock taking exercise: (i) themes emerging from 
variation across PFM process areas; (ii) themes arising from variation across 
countries.  
   12
II.  Themes from stories across PFM processes 
 
27.  The search for themes to explain varying scores on PEFA’s dimensions 
centered on three issues: differences in process type itself, different challenges in 
process areas, and different actor combinations involved in meeting challenges. 
Research into these yields the following themes: (i) Budgets are made better than they 
are executed; (ii) Practice lags behind the creation of processes and laws; and (iii) 
Actor concentration pays. 
A.    Budgets are made better than they are executed 
28.  In PFM jargon upstream processes relate to budget planning and preparation 
while downstream processes involve resource management and execution, accounting 
and all aspects of external accountability. Figure 4 organizes the scores on the non-
outcome PEFA dimensions into the process area clusters introduced in Figure 1, to 
show how scores vary as one moves from the upstream on left to downstream at right. 
 
Fig. 4. Showing PEFA dimension variation by process area cluster 
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Note: Stratbud = strategic budgeting; Budprep = Budget preparation; Legbud= Legislative budget analysis; 
Tax= Tax management; Debt=Debt management; Don=Donor engagement; Cash = Cash management; 
Proc=procurement; Payroll= Human Resources and Payroll management; IC=Internal Control; IA=Internal 
Audit; Mon=Monitoring; Acc=Accounts reconciliation; IYR=In year reporting; AR = Annual reporting; 
SR=Special reporting; EA=External audit; Legaud=Legislative audit analysis. 
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29.  Figure 4 illustrates that, while not uniform, dimension averages appear higher 
upstream than downstream. In lay-man’s terms, African countries tend to make 
budgets better than they execute them.  de Renzio describes a similar finding: 
“Average scores tend to deteriorate the further one moves down the various phases of 
the budget cycle, from formulation to execution, reporting and scrutiny.”
15 Recent 
work by the Open Budget Initiative also resonates, finding that transparency is often 
higher in the budget preparation stages of the PFM process than in execution and 
external accountability stages.
16 The difference in average upstream and downstream 
scores is just under 0.25,
17  with twice as many countries scoring D on downstream 
dimensions (11 compared with 6.9 in upstream processes).
18 Figure 5 shows the 
averages of each process index to reflect these differences, noting the four strongest 
(1-4) and weakest (15-18) process areas.  
Fig. 5. Variation across the PFM system, by process area index scores 
 
 
National and Sectoral Policy 
Review and Development 
Process
1. Strategic Budgeting
(policy-budget connection, resource 
envelope, ceilings)
2. Budget Preparation
3. Resource Management
Financial resources (revenue, 
customs, debt, cash), procurement, 
personnel and capital management
4. Internal Controls, 
Internal Audit and 
Monitoring  
5. Accounting and 
Reporting
6. External Audit and 
Accountability
PEM System
Budget Preparation 
Average 2.41 Std. dev 0.54 
Legislative Budget Deliberation 
Average 2.37 Std. dev 0.73 
Strategic Budgeting 
Average 1.95 
Std.dev 0.63 
Resource Management 
Inflows (Taxes) Average 2.29 Std. dev 0.47 
(Debt) Average 2.31 Std. dev 0.79 
(Donors) Average 1.81 Std. dev 0.89 
Outflows (Cash) Average 2.19 Std. dev 0.72 
 (Procurement) Average 1.95 Std. dev 0.71 
 (HR/Payroll) Average 1.95 Std. dev 0.77 
Internal control, audit and monitoring 
Internal controls Avge 1.94 Std. d. 0.73 
Internal audit Avge 1.8 Std. d. 0.71 
Monitoring Avge 1.86 Std. d. 0.79 
PFM System 
Accounting and reporting  
Accounts reconciliation  
Avge 2.20 Std. d. 0.75 
In-year-reporting  
Avge 2.03 Std. d. 0.86 
Annual reporting  
Avge 2.04 Std. d. 0.86 
Special reporting  
Avge 1.44 Std. d. 0.61 
External accountability 
External audit Avge 1.71 Std. d. 0.70 
Legislative audit analysis  
Avge 1.68 Std. d. 0.77 
1
2
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4
16 
15 
17 
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Upstream 
process  
areas 
30.  The top two index scores are in the budget preparation area—related to formal 
budget process issues (like presence of a calendar) and legislative engagement in 
budget preparation. The bottom three are in the downstream reporting and external 
accountability sections. Among the weaker areas, one finds internal controls, internal 
audit, monitoring and payroll and procurement (all non-budget areas). The difference 
between the budget preparation and special reporting indexes is about one (a rung on 
                                                 
15 de Renzio, P. (2008) “Taking Stock: What Do PEFA Assessments Tell Us About PFM Systems Across 
Countries?” Unpublished manuscript produced with support of the PEFA Secretariat, p.6. 
16 See the 2008 Open Budget Initiative Report: openbudgetindex.org/files/FinalFullReportEnglish1.pdf. 
17 Statistically significant at 0.05. 
18 A statistically significant difference at 0.01   14
the ‘ladder’ in figure 2!). This means that the average African country is mid-way up 
the ladder in the way it makes the budget, but only just above the lowest rung in 
regard to reporting of arrears, extra-budgetary expenditure, donor funded projects, 
activities in public enterprises and sub-national governments, and resources collected 
at points of service delivery. An interesting number is the statistically significant -
0.69 difference between legislative practices in budget preparation and legislative 
practices in audit analysis. The same entity is involved in both process areas, but 
upstream activities are materially and significantly stronger than downstream ones! 
31.  This ‘stronger upstream’ theme manifests in the content of introductory and 
summary sections of PFM-PR documents as well. 13 of the 31 documents reflect on 
the issue, either broadly (referring to stronger budget preparation versus execution 
processes) or narrowly (contrasting strengths in specific upstream areas with 
weaknesses in those downstream). The theme cuts across all countries, regardless of 
income or colonial legacy and suggests simply that budgets are made better than they 
are executed (and overseen). There are demand and supply side reasons why this is 
so: some evidence suggests that budget reforms are more emphasized by donors, for 
example, and that budget offices are more resourced than others, for example. These 
reasons raise some questions about potential civil society impacts: Could CSO 
demand for downstream processes and CSO downstream capacity building decrease 
the upstream-downstream gap? This issue is explored in Box 1.
19  
 
In contrast, Zambia’s PFM-PR laments the lack of demand for accountability and the lack of civil 
society pressure for such. It argues that, “The degree of public scrutiny and pressure on the Government 
to meet its reform commitments should be improved … [and] … civil society can play a role in 
exercising sufficient pressure for good PFM.” CSOs do operate in the upstream of the budget process— 
with entities like the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction programme (CSPR) focusing attention on  
connections between the budget and PRSP. The CSPR does less work in the PFM downstream, 
monitoring and reporting on actual spending. Similarly, legislative strengthening initiatives often focus 
on budget reviews but not audit review. Lesotho is an example.  CSO engagements of the watchdog 
and advocacy varieties are required to help balance the upstream-downstream process divide. 
Gabon’s reporting streams are particularly weak and its spending is non-transparent. The PFM-PR 
notes, however, that efforts to comply with EITI have led to government hiring a special auditor to 
identify oil-related revenue and expenditure streams, potentially bolstering the supply side of 
transparency. EITI, motivated by international development organizations and CSOs, is also 
undergirding demand for improved transparency in budgetary reporting and accountability 
mechanisms. Country 18 cites EITI as a major source of demand for downstream strengthening—
particularly for reporting and audit. CSOs work with government in a National Stakeholder’s Working 
Group to analyze audit reports. CSOs are becoming more budget-literate in the process, demand for 
audits has increased, and the quality of reporting is increasingly under scrutiny.” 
Box 1- Civil society engagements can stimulate demand, supply in the PFM downstream 
Kenyan civil society has been engaged in a variety of PFM areas since 2000, including participating in 
budget hearings, tender board negotiations and—most recently—assisting with the production of public 
expenditure tracking surveys (PETS). Civil society in Sierra Leone monitors government expenditure 
through district level budget oversight committees, which involve widespread community sensitisation 
meetings on budgetary and public financial matters.   
                                                 
19 The evidence of CSO engagement was typically not identified in World Bank analytical products but 
rather through personal correspondence with civil society groups in specific countries. This correspondence 
was corroborated with published references of civil society engagement, in the media as well as—where 
possible—literature coming out of development organizations. References are available from the author.   15
B.    Practice lags behind the creation of processes and laws 
32.  If the first PFM process theme is about where a dimension or process area is 
found in the PFM stream, the second relates to its depth. Different PEFA dimensions 
reflect different types and depth of challenge. Some center on legislation or process 
development only. While they may have some element of practice inferred, countries 
can achieve C and B scores on these dimensions largely by attending to de jure issues 
(having a procedural step in place, even if it has little influence on behavior). Other 
dimensions involve implementation of laws and action within processes, or ongoing 
activity or production. Countries can only achieve C and B scores by overcoming de 
facto hurdles of practice. Consider the comparison between the following criteria: A 
government can get a C on the budget preparation dimension PI 11.i. if it has a 
rudimentary budget calendar in place (most often in law), even if substantial delays 
exist in implementation;
20 A C on the strategic budgeting PI 12.i. requires, in 
contrast, that actual forecasts be developed, on the basis of economic classification, 
for at least two years, on a rolling annual basis. Readers may not relate to the 
technicalities of the last sentence, but should get the idea that it demands evidence of 
re and 
38 as  
Table 2. Comparing scores in de jure and de facto dimension categori
dimensions 
sc l 
dimensions 
(averag )  jure d
Co g 
(averag ) 
M  
dimensions 
sc  
(averag ) 
practice.  
33.  Systematic differences in the way governments meet the different kinds of 
challenges implied in these examples show up in an important theme; practice lags 
behind the creation of processes and laws. The theme reflects a prominent new 
institutional differentiation between de jure and de facto institutions, which argues 
that the former are less demanding to adopt and change than the latter. It is apparent 
in comparing the more de jure budget preparation dimension and the more de facto 
strategic budgeting dimension shown above:  There are double the number of D 
scores (10) on the more de facto strategic budgeting dimension than on the more de 
jure budget preparation dimension (which has a low 5 Ds, and 10 Bs). Similar 
observations were made when comparing other high scoring and low scoring 
dimensions in the budget preparation and strategic budgeting areas, especially after 
these were coded as ‘de jure’ (if a C could be achieved with minimal de facto 
engagement) and de facto (if scoring a C required more implementation).
21 Coding 
was done blind by three independent people, with little variation. 64 dimensions were 
coded (excluding nine outcome and donor dimensions) with 26 coded as de ju
 de facto. Table 2 shows how types differ in averages and number of Ds. 
es 
Countries 
oring D in de
facto 
dimensions  Mean all 
Countries 
oring D in al
e
Mean for  de 
imensions 
untries scorin
D in de jure 
dimensions 
e
ean for  de
facto 
e
 
2.08  10.69 2.33  6.57  1.91  13.50 
                                                 
20 Governments can even score a B with “some delays”, suggesting a low de facto hurdle even at this level. 
An A requires that the budget calendar is adhered to, reflecting a significant de facto hurdle.  
21 C was chosen as a benchmark here because it appears the crucial point of differentiation between 
stronger and weaker dimensions.    16
34.  Not surprisingly, the averages of the dimension categories are quite different, 
with the de jure dimensions having a mean almost half a point above the de facto 
dimensions (2.33 compared with 1.91). More countries score D on de facto 
dimensions as well; 13.5 countries fall in this category on average, compared with 
just 6.57 for the de jure dimensions. Both the differences in means and number of 
countries scoring D are significant at the 1 % level, suggesting the statistical strength 
of the theme. Interestingly, 75 % of the total number of D scores (across all countries) 
in the 64 dimension sample is in the de facto category. This, with the other evidence, 
implies that African systems are stronger in a de jure than a de facto sense, at least on 
average. Put simply once again, African PFM practice lags behind the creation of 
re 
nsions 
ensions 
processes and laws.  Figures 6 and Figure 7 illustrate higher averages in de ju
dimensions, and higher number of D scores in de facto dimensions. 
Fig. 6. Average scores on dimensions : Separating de jure and de facto dime
Figure 7. Countries scoring D on dimensions : Separating de jure and de facto dim
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 1 02 03 04 05 06 0
Dimensions n=64
Average score
de jure  de facto
0
15
20
25
 
5
1
0  10 20 30 40 50 60
Dimensions n=64)
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
s
c
o
r
i
n
g
 
D
 
o
n
 
e
a
c
h
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
0
de jure  de facto   17
 
35.  Qualitative evidence speaks to this theme as well. The content of all 31 PFM-
PR documents was analyzed to see how frequently dimension descriptions in the 
introductory and analytical sections explicitly noted an implementation deficit, using 
key words (like implementation, practice, and adherence). These explicit references 
were noted in the descriptions of 297 dimension scores—about 15 % of the total or 
nine and a half dimension areas per country. Six PFM-PRs were analyzed in more 
detail to identify less explicit references to this theme as well (where the key words 
were not used but more lengthy descriptions still showed that laws and/or procedures 
were in place but not being translated into action). 27 extra dimension areas were 
identified in the six PFM-PRs, averaging four and a half dimensions per country. 
When added to the explicit references, these suggest that an average of 14 dimension 
 
scores per country reference the gap between laws and practice (a 22 % frequency).  
36.  Readers should note that there are also numerous references to de jure 
weaknesses in the PFM-PRs. Summary sections of five PFM-PRs note generalized 
legal deficiencies and at least half of the documents cite specific weaknesses—
especially affecting medium-term budgeting, internal and external audit, and the 
scope of legislative scrutiny. Most of the legal shortcomings are noted in 
Francophone countries, relating particularly to audit and legislative analysis of audits. 
The PFM-PRs include numerous calls for legal and procedural reform in response to 
such perceived weaknesses, which may be appropriate and have certainly constituted 
first steps to reform in many of the other countries and process areas (as will be 
discussed later in the paper). However, it should also be noted that some of the 
perceived weaknesses referenced in the PFM-PRs are viewed as variations in legal 
practices across other countries: OECD countries legislate differently in regard to the 
role of the legislature and even the scope and practice of internal and external audit,
and most OECD countries still do not legislate multi-year budgets (even for capital).  
37.  The basic story appears to be that de jure needs for effective PFM are 
contextually defined, and may not be the same across all settings. Taken in concert 
with the theme that many laws and procedures actually on the books in Africa are not 
implemented, the current message would suggest caution in emphasizing de jure 
solutions, even when such appear to respond to de jure deficits. Especially where the 
deficits in question may reflect different governing heritage, culture or level of 
political fragility (as is also the case in the Francophone countries noted above). The 
challenge appears to be ensuring that laws in place are actually implemented, and new 
procedures are selectively introduced with specific strategies to ensure they shape 
behavior. Evidence suggests a number of reasons why laws are not implemented, 
including: de jure structures are new in many cases, and secondary regulations that 
authorize de facto action are yet to be introduced; problems of coordination 
undermine implementation; Capacity constraints undermine execution; laws are not 
accepted and incentives undermine their effect; political will is lacking. On top of 
these issues, some might argue that time is the major missing ingredient and that 
countries just need a few years to close the gap between practice and the processes 
and laws they have just introduced. This may be so, but the argument would be     18
simplified: ‘Time’ matters only insofar as it is well used, and the above list of hurdles 
to de facto effectiveness pose a major challenge for even the best users of time. 
38.  It is not hard to see how civil society engagements might make a difference in 
addressing t the gap 
itself might create opportunities for CSOs. Box 2 explores some of these.  
                                                
he gap at the center of this theme. It is also not hard to see how 
22
 
Box 2- CSOs filling the gap between new laws and old practices in Africa 
 
CSOs all over Africa are taking advantage of new opportunities created by de jure reforms in the PFM 
system, especially filling the gap in situations where old practice persists despite new laws.  
Malawi is a prime example. The PFM-PR indicates that “the Government has implemented a numbe
of statutory measures in recent years to develop a sound legal framework for effective PFM” (manife
particularly in a string of 2003 laws). It notes, however, that “concerns remain over the level of 
compliance by Ministries etc. with existing PFM regulations and a continuing lack of enforcement” 
suggesting that practice lags behind the creation of processes and laws. A local CSO called Malawi 
Economic Justice Network (MEJN) is engaging where law allows and government practice is falling 
behind. It played a key role mobilizing civil society in preparing and monitoring the Malawi Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (MPRS), for example. Cameroon’s Dynamique Citoyenne du Cameroun emerge
as an umbrella organization of multiple CSOs to participate in developing and monitoring the PRSP. 
Since 2005 it has played a growing role building independent capacity to monitor the budget p
Cameroon, taking advantage of legal and procedural innovations accommodating public scrutiny in 
government activities. Benin has modernized its procurement process in recent years, and introduc
competitive bidding requirements. The challenge is now to ensure that officials adhere to the 
requirements. A local CSO called Fonac is working hard to ensure that transactions are monitored
government is held accountable, and incentives are clearly developed to foster adherence. Similar 
r 
st 
d 
rocess in 
ed 
, 
Os of this variety, with few 
members (which accounting ROSCs will attest). The formal legislation of government accounting 
nge; as American accountant Joseph 
ret said rtunity.” 
examples can be found across the 31 countries, including the Centre for Budget Advocacy at the 
Integrated Social Development Centre in Ghana (CBA/ISODEC), the Civil Society for Poverty 
Reduction programme in Zambia (CSPR) and Nigeria’s National Budget Monitoring Project (NBMP).  
Much international support for CSOs is predicated on observations that CSOs can engage more in PFM 
issues than before, because of de jure ‘space’. International engagement can undermine legitimacy of 
local actors, however, and must be carefully thought out. Some of the more successful engagements—
though on the margins at present—arise through international professional associations. The 
International Consortium of Governmental Financial Managers, IFAC, and other international 
accounting and auditing groups are working in places like Ethiopia and Mozambique, Uganda and 
Tanzania, to assist in capacity building in government, supporting and strengthening audit offices, and 
facilitating transfers of professional norms vital to the implementation of technical tools (like 
accounting standards). These engagements are often tied to development of profession-based domestic 
CSOs (like local accounting associations or public finance professional groups). Historical evidence 
from western countries like the United States shows that these entities are pivotal in establishing 
formal, norm-based, professional financial management structures in public and private settings.
1 One 
should note that most African countries have only fledgling professional CS
without such professional backbone will not lead to de facto cha
Ster  in 1904, “Legislation for a profession only grants oppo
 
22As noted earlier, the evidence of CSO engagement was typically not identified in World Bank analytical 
products but rather through personal correspondence with civil society groups in specific countries. This 
correspondence was corroborated with published references of civil society engagement, in the media as 
well as—where possible—literature coming out of development organizations. References are available 
from the author.   19
C.    Actor concentration pays (at least to date) 
39.  The first two themes distinguish between upstream and downstream and de 
jure and de facto process types. The third contrasts the strength of processes involving 
small, concentrated sets of actors from those requiring the engagement of broad, de-
concentrated actor sets. It notes that actor concentration pays (at least to date). This 
theme manifests as a reason why some downstream dimensions score unexpectedly 
well. PI 22.i, the dimension speaking to regularity of bank reconciliations, averages 
2.55, the 8
th highest process dimension. The other reconciliation dimension is PI.22.ii. 
It centers on reconciliation of suspense accounts and advances, and scores a low 1.71 
on average (ranking 54
th of 64). Nineteen countries score a D on the second 
dimension compared with the low number of 7 countries scoring a D on the first. 
Why? The answer is alluded to in score descriptions across the countries, which relate 
the concentrated role played by Treasuries (or Accountant General Offices) in regard 
to the first dimension, as contrasted with the de-concentrated roles played by multiple 
Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) in regard to the second. A C is scored 
on 22.i. when treasury managed accounts only are reconciled. Suspense and advance 
e 
igher
concentrate . 5.8 countries sco
on average, while 12.9 countries (on average) score Ds on de-concentrated 
dimensions. Figures 8 and 9 show these differences for all of the PEFA dimensions. 
Fig. 8. Average scores in concentrated and de-
concentrated areas 
Fig. 9. Number of countries scoring D in 
concentrated and de-concentrated areas 
account reconciliation is a more complicated activity, given that these are often 
managed by MDAs, a more de-concentrated set of actors. The impact of de-
concentration is referenced in Mozambique’s PFM-PR which states that, “Monthly 
reconciliation is possible only for Treasury-managed bank accounts.”  
40.  Twenty six dimensions were coded as involving ‘concentrated’ actors only 
(like Budget Directorates, Debt Units, Treasuries). The average score across thes
dimensions is 2.42, which is significantly h
d dimensions (1.97)
 (at 0.01) than the average for de-
re Ds on concentrated dimensions, 
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41.  Content analysis of the 31 PEFA documents yielded 116 references linking 
weaker performance with de-concentration, equating to about 4 per document. This 
theme reflects itself indirectly as well, however, as PFM-PRs relate weaknesses that 
arise because of de-concentrated connections across processes. The ability of MDAs 
to develop strategies is undermined by the lack of accounting information in many   20
governments, for example. Downstream performance of auditing entities and 
legislatures is also compromised by poor performance in other areas, particularly the 
late and/or poor production of financial reports. Table 3 illustrates how a fallen 
domino in the financial reporting area can cause dominos to fall in areas of audit, 
response to audit and legislative audit examination. The problem could be going the 
o ines 
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her 
in aggrega n control of 
specific, co e involved in 
achieving disaggregated results. Figure 10 shows that aggregated revenue 
performance has the highest average and lowest number of countries scoring Ds.  
Fig.10. Comparing averages and d-scores in outcome areas 
ther way for sure: lack of legislative demand for timely accounts underm
centi ce the accou al direction, on  can see ves to produ nts. Regardless of caus
players in different process a
erformance.
e
onnectedness of differe
entration of reform
nd resu
Table 3. Problematic de
If score = 1 on 
dencies and domino effects in t
 likelihood score = 1 
downstr
 
iness of submissi
financial statements 
If score = 1 on 
submission of 
eliness of audit reports submit
to legislature 
d score =
audit find
financial statements   
If score = 1 on 
Timeliness of submission of 
financial statements 
Then likelihood score = 1 on 
Timeliness of examination of audit 
reports 
 
= 92 % 
 
42.  The relative weakness of interdependent and de-concentrated PFM process 
areas also manifests in contrasting outcome performance. Most countries score hig
ted outcomes that are directly influenced by the top-dow
ncentrated entities and score worse when many entities ar
 
 
43.  Aggregate revenue reliability (Revagg, which measures whether actual 
receipts reflect those forecast in budgets) averages 3.03 (above a B) across the 31 
countries, reflecting a variety of strong interventions by central budget and revenue 
agencies, including tighter and more conservative forecasting and better revenue 
collection. Average aggregate expenditure (Expagg, which measures whether on 
aggregate actual expenditure matches budgeted expenditure) performance is also high 
0 
Mean D scores
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18 
Expagg Expcom Revagg Arrears  21
(at 2.8), largely because of the improved control from budget departments and 
treasuries (through more formal procedures, calendars and the use of ceilings in 
budget preparation and in cash management, for example, an important part of the 
‘top down’ model of budgeting touted in development). When one looks at 
disaggregated outcomes, where de-concentrated actor sets are more directly involved, 
performance drops considerably. Performance in managing the stock of arrears is 
more than half a point below aggregate expenditure and revenue performance, on 
average—with a mean of 2.2 and 13 countries scoring D. Descriptions like the 
following (from Swaziland) tie such directly to the problem of de-concentration: 
“There is no reliable data … It is practically impossible to document arrears … 
because the collection of data is not centralized. Data are scattered among line 
ministries and agencies and are not kept up to date.” Countries perform the worst on 
the highly disaggregated ‘composition of expenditure’ dimension (Expcom), which 
assesses the match between expenditure composition in budget papers and actual out-
turns (asking if the disaggregated detail of actual expenditure matches the 
disaggregated detail of budgets). The average for this dimension is 1.8 and there are 
ited in 
like education and health in countries like Country 11 constitute enclaves of 
excellence in this regard, with projects and other kinds of technical links to donors 
also facilitating ties to central PFM reform processes. These projects can bridge 
organizations and ensure greater reach for reforms. Civil Society Organizations are 
16 countries scoring Ds, reflecting a variety of different issues ranging from the 
failure of central control mechanisms to shape allocations to weak formulation and 
execution in MDAs—problems outside of the purview of the central budget 
department or treasury. 
44.  PFM-PRs provide a usual suspect list of reasons why concentrated processes 
seem more advanced: capacity constraints, political interferences and problems with 
culture and acceptance are the most commonly noted as being worse when multiple 
de-concentrated entities are involved. There are other problems peculiar to this theme, 
however, related to ‘reach’ in governments, and the information and communication 
weaknesses underlying such: Central entities engaged in reform need to control and 
communicate with affected entities that are distributed. Weak information and 
communication mechanisms undermine system integrity. Some countries have 
addressed the distributed engagement problem by introducing Financial Management 
Information Systems (FMIS) to systematize engagements. Automated systems can 
enhance the reach of new sets of standards, rules, accounting methods and such that 
have been introduced centrally. Mozambique hopes that its e-SISTAFE system will 
help concentrate information. But other stories of FMIS introduction suggest the 
intervention is itself limited by the concentration/de-concentration theme. Tanzania’s 
FMIS reform is widely considered successful, for example, but is still lim
scope and coverage, related to problems of de-concentration—opposition to reform 
from de-concentrated entities, weak capacity in de-concentrated entities. Rather than 
the FMIS solving these problems, the problems have appropriately become the focus 
of ensuring successful FMIS reform itself (still, 6 years after reform began).  
45.  Other approaches to de-concentration involve improving coordination across 
the PFM system. Opportunities for coordination seem greater in areas where 
international entities are working with MDAs on sectoral strategies already. Sectors   22
also playing important roles in connecting entities and mitigating the weaknesses of 
de-concentration in PFM systems, discussed briefly in Box 3.
23  
 
 
The convening power of civil society was vital to ensuring success in Uganda’s PRSP and budget 
reforms thereafter: “Despite the short time-frame, Uganda succeeded in mobilizing people at grassroots 
level to participate in influencing policy planning and sharing information” largely because of the work 
of “The Ugandan Debt Network, [other] national non-governmental organisations, research institutions, 
other civil society groups as well as hundreds of individuals from all walks of life.” The advocacy and 
watchdog roles of organizations like the Ugandan Debt Network (UDN) are often emphasized more 
than its fundamental role as a convening entity. The UDN manages to engage CSOs from many 
different sectors in its activities, allowing monitoring across de-concentrated parts of the Ugandan 
government. Broad engagement like this is vital to creating incentives for de-concentrated entities to 
improve PFM, facilitate capacity building opportunities and accommodate information transfer.
 The African Capacity Building Foundation has been working to build bridges between de-
concentrated MDAs and central budget and planning entities in West Africa. The aim is to strengthen 
the platform for enhanced dialogue among the public sector and a Network of Chambers of Agriculture 
of Benin, Guinea, Côte d’ Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Togo. The project is currently improving 
information access on agricultural issues, allowing better policy development and budgeting. 
Lesotho’s PFM-PR notes the important role regional professional accounting entities can play in 
entrenching new accounting mechanisms throughout government, especially in support of its IFMIS. 
The initiative is an imperative because “financial controllers need to take a more pro-active role in 
ensuring financial probity in their ministries.” The initiative is being accommodated by “Moves … to 
develop a training program through the Eastern and Southern African Associations of Accountants 
General…in collaboration with the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy.” Similar 
initiatives to strengthen professional accounting bodies are in place in Mozambique. 
Box 3- Can CSOs help reach de-concentrated actors? 
 
A key PFM pattern in Africa reflects the relative strength of interventions under the control of single, 
concentrated entities. PFM performance declines in areas involving multiple, de-concentrated role 
players. General constraints are exaggerated in de-concentrated settings. An extra set of challenges 
arise in regard to information transfers and communications with such entities. CSOs are well 
positioned to play a role in addressing some of these challenges, bridging concentrated and de-
concentrated players and facilitating reach through capacity building and professionalization programs. 
 
                                                 
23 As noted earlier, the evidence of CSO engagement was typically not identified in World Bank analytical 
products but rather through personal correspondence with civil society groups in specific countries. This 
correspondence was corroborated with published references of civil society engagement, in the media as 
well as—where possible—literature coming out of development organizations. References are available 
from the author.   23
III.   Themes from stories across countries 
 
46.  The themes identified thus far help to understand why different PFM 
dimensions and process areas appear to ‘perform’ differently in Africa. Performance 
varies across African countries in the sample as well. This is explored in the current 
section, which shows how the PEFA data shows countries falling into different 
‘leagues’ and then explores five country characteristics to better understand why: (i) 
Income and income growth; (ii) Country fragility; (iii) Revenue source and 
dependence; (iv) General reform commitment; (v) Colonial legacy. 
A.    Countries are in different PFM performance leagues 
47.  Introductory sections of the PFM-PRs suggest major differences in the PFM 
system qualities in different countries, similar to the variation one would find in 
sporting teams competing in different leagues. The PFM-PR for country 5 describes a 
“context of dysfunction…in respect of public financial management.” Contrast this 
with the comment that Benin’s PFM system provides important “conditions [for] the 
success of the poverty reduction strategy” and the following description of Mauritius: 
“The Government has well developed and consolidated the potential of the present 
PFM platform … The major next steps will aim to position the Mauritian 
Government at par with international standards and best practice in PFM.” Figure 11 
uses PEFA data to illustrate variation implied in these written descriptions. It shows 
how average dimension scores (over 64 dimensions) vary for each country (with 
averages calculated without any weighting). Some countries are given a number, not a 
name, because of confidentiality issues pertaining to their PEFA reports. 
Fig. 11. The average PEFA score, for all 31 countries (over 64 dimensions) 
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48.  The figure reveals a pattern of different PFM performance leagues. These can 
be organized in various ways. Five leagues were constructed to allow greatest 
differentiation and contrast. The top league (5) includes Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Ethiopia and country 11. These countries all score a notch 
above the next league. Country 11 is at the break-point with the next league, scoring 
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marginally higher but recording a substantially larger proportion of plus 2 and plus 3 
scores. Country 11’s average dimension score is 2.67, which stands in stark contrast 
to 1.54, country 12’s average score (the highest in the lowest league). Performance 
differences in the 5 leagues are shown further in Figures 12 and 13. Figure 12 
illustrates differences in the 18 process indexes introduced in Figure 1 while Figure 
13 presents differences by league in an index of outcomes.
24 Taken together, the two 
figures show simply that countries are in different PFM performance leagues in 
which—mirroring any sports league—competitors in different leagues have 
significantly different characteristics and results. The extent and significance of the 
differences between leagues is obviously most marked when comparing the top and 
bottom groups. At the extreme, league 1 lags league 5 by more than one point in 17 of 
18 process areas (and in outcomes).   
Fig.12. Process index scores by league 
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Fig.13. Outcome scores by league 
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24 The outcome index sums scores for aggregate expenditure and revenue, expenditure composition and 
size of arrears. A score out of 4 is then derived or each country and subsequently averaged for leagues.   25
 
49.  Figure 14 shows how different leagues vary in the way they perform on the 
process types introduced earlier—upstream, downstream, de facto, de jure, 
concentrated and de-concentrated. Ovals cluster certain averages, showing which 
group averages are significantly lower than others, in a statistical sense. League 5 
dimensions are significantly stronger than those in leagues 1 and 2 in five out of six 
thematic areas, the exception being concentrated dimensions (where higher league 5 
scores are not statistically different from those in other leagues). League 5 averages 
exceed league 3 averages in all areas as well, but its advantage is only statistically 
significant in three of these—the downstream, de facto and de-concentrated 
dimension areas. League 3 countries are significantly stronger than league 1 and 2 
countries in exactly these areas—particularly upstream and de jure dimensions.  
Fig. 14. Fleshing out the differences between leagues, by theme 
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50.  Figure 15 sums the story of PFM leagues in Africa, showing what seems to 
differentiate lower from mid and mid from top league countries.  
Fig.15. Summing up the differences between leagues 
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51.  Figure 15 illustrates the following: Lower league countries (1 and 2) have 
weak dimensions no matter how these are categorized; de jure and de facto are weak, 
as are concentrated, de-concentrated, upstream and downstream. League 3 countries 
share weak downstream, de facto and de-concentrated dimensions with lower league 
countries; but league 3 countries are strengthening PFM dimensions that are in the 
upstream, de jure in nature, and centered on the engagement of concentrated actor 
sets. League 5 countries have already strengthened upstream, de jure and 
concentrated PFM areas; but these countries are currently challenged to strengthen 
the other dimensions—downstream, de facto and de-concentrated. 
52.  This evidence thus far speaks to the fact that African countries have quite 
different PFM system strengths. The evidence also suggests different challenges 
facing these countries. The above observations do not, however, help explain why 
countries fall into the leagues they do. They do not indicate which contextual issues 
influence PFM system strength and why. Such explanations flow from both the 
quantitative and qualitative data, however, and speak to the influence of various 
factors: Income and growth; Social, political and economic fragility; A country’s 
revenue source; The length of uninterrupted national reform, and; Colonial legacy. 
B.    Growing economies have stronger PFM 
53.  Figure 2 compared African and non-African country group averages on PEFA 
dimensions, finding Africa lagging behind the other sample in most dimensions. The 
comparison was considered unfair, however, because of different wealth profiles of 
the countries in the two groups. Countries in the non-African group had higher 
incomes per capita which was seen as a driver of their significantly higher PEFA 
scores, matching a finding by de Renzio in another recent study using similar data. 
So, one would expect to find income per capita influencing PEFA performance in 
Africa as well, with the top league countries expected to have higher per capita 
incomes and the lower league countries having lower per capita incomes.  
54.  The evidence does not support such expectation. Two of the six league 5 
countries (Ethiopia and Country 11) have among the weakest incomes per capita in 
the 31 country sample.  Eight of the top twelve PEFA performers have incomes at or 
below $1,000 per capita. In contrast, five of the ten countries with incomes per capita 
above $1,500 are in the lowest two leagues (the bottom twelve performers). This 
finding arises partly because of a relative lack of variation in country income levels in 
the African sample. The full PEFA sample of 73 countries includes eight countries 
with incomes per capita above $4,000 but the current sample only has two with one 
more on the margin. Two of these, Country 29 and Gabon, boast higher incomes per 
capita as the only reflection of a middle income type status—looking like less 
wealthy countries in every other respect—partly because both draw money from 
opportunistic revenue sources (external trade and remittances in Country 29 and oil in 
Gabon). It is interesting to note that Mauritius does show up as a positive outlier, 
significantly ahead of all other countries in most areas. Its average scores for both de 
jure and de facto dimensions are more than two symbols above Gabon’s (with both 
significant at 0.01). If the countries in higher income per capita brackets in the   27
African group were all like Mauritius (examples perhaps being Botswana and South 
Africa) one might find a positive country wealth effect on PFM quality. This would 
not change the fact, however, that lower income countries do appear in the top 
leagues. This is an important finding that speaks to the idea that low income is not a 
fatal limit on how high a country can climb on the ‘reform ladder’. 
55.  The relatively strong performance of lower per capita countries in Africa is 
not only due to a lack of truly middle income countries in the sample, however. PFM 
systems in lower income countries may be higher because they have been boosted 
through interventions particularly targeting poor nations. Countries like Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia were all beneficiaries from the Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC) which bought them some debt relief and 
made them subject to early PFM assessment and high reform pressure and 
engagement. Various countries cite the HIPC intervention as a vital influence on the 
PFM reform agenda, referencing the PRSP in similar respect. It appears that HIPC 
and PRSP created fiscal and reform space that has facilitated PFM improvement in 
these lower income settings. Fourteen of 31 countries speak of HIPC and PRSP in 
positive terms, referencing either the demand for reform spurred by debt relief or the 
opportunities for reform emerging from HIPC-linked technical assistance.  
56.  HIPC beneficiaries in the sample have mostly seen significant economic 
growth in the past ten years. This rate of growth in incomes per capita seems to 
matter a great deal to PFM performance, accommodating fiscal and reform space and 
underlying domestic and international demand for reform. The evidence strongly 
suggests that growing economies have stronger PFM. Figure 16 shows that three of 
the top five PEFA performers and eight of the top twelve PEFA performers recorded 
per capita economic growth of twenty percent or more between 1996 and 2006. In 
contrast, five of the bottom six countries (league 1) recorded growth below zero 
percent in the period. The differences in growth rates between league 1 and league 5 
PFM performers are quite apparent in the figure, with both isolated in the ovals to left 
and right. The average PFM score in lower growth countries (below 1% per annum) 
lags that in higher growth countries in 84 % of the PEFA dimensions, with 22 % of 
these differences being statistically significant. 
Fig. 16. Per capita GDP growth rates (96-06) for weakest to strongest PFM performers 
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57.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine how the interaction of 
economic growth and PFM strengthening works. Indeed there are various schools of 
thought on this, which have different perspectives on the reasons for interaction and 
the directions of causality. Some suggest that economic growth creates demand for 
improved governance and generates a necessary supply of skilled people. Others 
suggest that commitments to improved governance can generate economic growth, so 
that a PFM reform commitment might just be a way for political leaders to attract FDI 
and facilitate growth. Others suggest that the issue is rather one of changed culture, 
which could come from the private or public sectors and which may facilitate both 
improved governance and growth. Future research on this topic is vital and could 
assist policymakers in working out exactly what the connection is between the 
technicalities of PFM reform and the real world realities of economic development 
and growth. 
58.   As noted, this paper does not delve into such question. It does, however, 
identify the PFM process areas seemingly most influenced by economic growth. 
These emerge as the process areas in which fast and slow growth countries record the 
biggest differences in index scores. They are manifest throughout the PFM system 
except monitoring. Figure 17 shows differences in all process indexes: Dark arrows 
indicate where differences in means are significant at 0.01 (strategic budgeting and 
legislative budget review) and lighter arrows indicate significance at 0.05.  
Fig. 17. Comparing average process index scores, in lower and higher growth country groups 
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Note: The dark arrows indicate statistical significance of the difference in means at 0.01; lighter arrows 
indicate statistical significance of the difference in means at 0.05. 
 
59.  HIPC inspired debt relief and associated reform opportunities, together with 
sustained economic growth, seem to have accommodated PFM improvements in a 
number of African countries over the past decade, creating space for new ideas and 
approaches and demand for such. It is interesting to note that CSO engagement in 
some of these countries also seems to reflect new opportunities emerging from more   29
developed economies. The growth of private business interests has spawned CSOs 
representing such in countries like Ghana and Mozambique, for example, and new tax 
advocacy groups are proving influential in holding governments accountable for the 
way they raise and spend resources. CSOs in these settings face their own challenges, 
however, because of the increased sophistication of the economies they are engaged 
with. One is seeing opportunities for CSOs working to build capacity of other CSOs 
in such settings, as yet another role for these entities (see Box 4 for examples).  
C.    Stability delivers PFM progress 
60.  Economic growth is often influenced by political and social conditions. 
Instability or fragility can undermine growth prospects and the development of 
government systems. Figure 18 illustrates this in the African group, organizing the 
countries in their leagues but showing their per capita growth rates and identifying 
which ones are considered fragile. Five of the six weakest PEFA performers (all in 
league 1) are also considered ‘fragile’ (given IMF classifications) because of 
instability, and four of these had sub-zero growth rates between 1996 and 2006.
25 
Three of the six countries in league 2 are similarly labeled.
26 Only one country 
outside of the bottom two leagues is considered fragile, and this is Sierra-Leone.  
Fig. 18. Fragility, growth, and the African leagues of nations 
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61.  The impact of fragility on PFM system performance is startling. Fragile 
country averages are lower than non-fragile countries in respect of 95 % of the PEFA 
dimensions.
27 The difference in means is greater than 0.75 and statistically significant 
in respect of more than half of the dimensions.
28 Legislative dimensions of all kinds 
                                                 
25 These are countries 2, 5, 12 and 15. The ‘fragile’ classification is made according to the IMF’s 2007 
Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa. IMF. 2007. Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-
Saharan Africa. IMF: Washington, D.C. 
26 These are countries 3,6 and 19. 
27 61 out of 64. 
28 33 differences in means exceed 0.75; 35 differences in means are statistically significant at 0.05 or better.   30
are weaker in fragile countries.
29 All dimensions in strategic budgeting and budget 
preparation process areas are significantly weaker as are the dimensions reflecting 
budget transparency and crucial downstream processes like cash management, 
procurement, payroll control and internal control.
30 Interestingly, fragile states score 
relatively better on concentrated PFM dimensions—in areas of budget management, 
treasury and revenue management, for example—than they do on any other 
dimensions. This seems to reflect the fact that some of the fragile states maintain 
small, concentrated cadres in select areas, even through political and social turmoil 
(budget offices or treasuries might remain intact). 
62.  Figure 19 shows the processes in which aggregated dimension scores yield 
major differences between fragile and stable countries. Eight out of eighteen 
differences in mean between fragile and stable countries are statistically significant at 
0.01 and a further six are statistically significant at 0.05.  
Fig. 19. Comparing average process index scores, in fragile and stable country groups 
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Note: The dark arrows indicate statistical significance of the difference in means at 0.01; lighter 
arrows indicate statistical significance of the difference in means at 0.05. 
 
63.  The PFM-PRs for these fragile countries all describe costs of conflict for 
development, and the particular challenges fragility brings to PFM. Country 2 is 
described as “characterized by a climate of insecurity … [which] … has a negative 
impact on the economic development and the living conditions of the populations.” 
Ongoing conflict in country 15 is blamed for making the “economy … dull, 
particularly fragile and vulnerable” and “degrading … the financial standing of the 
State.” Country 5’s PFM-PR links such developmental interruptions and PFM 
weakness, manifest in the failure to pass key laws and produce budgets: “The various 
political crises and conflicts … since 1998 … [led to a] deterioration of the economic 
situation. The resulting financial difficulties generated dysfunctions in public finance 
management which resulted in delays in adoption of the finance laws of the years 
                                                 
29 All seven dimensions lag by more than 0.75 and all of the differences are highly significant (six at 0.01). 
30 In all of these areas every single dimension is more than 0.75 points weaker in fragile countries, and in 
all cases these differences are statistically significant (at 0.05 or better).   31
2001 and 2002, the absence of a budget in 2003 and the recourse to exceptional 
budget execution procedures.” 
64.  The various PFM narratives suggest that fragile countries sport the kinds of 
weaknesses one finds associated with PFM problems in the other countries, but in an 
exaggerated form. Capacity is not just weak, it is non-existent (apart from some 
concentrated areas). Informality reigns almost unchallenged in government processes, 
because of a lack of formal mechanisms (most visible in failures to even produce 
budgets in Country 5). Political will is lacking because politics is focused on conflict 
rather than public value creation. A basic message is that countries in such situations 
cannot do much to strengthen their PFM—basic political legitimacy must precede 
technical intervention. 
65.  In light of such observations it is interesting to note the kinds of areas where 
fragile states lag most behind the others. These include, particularly, dimensions 
related to the political side of the budgetary process. Fragile states average about a 
point lower than other countries on most aspects of legislative engagement, with 
differences in scores statistically significant in all cases. Fragile states also average 
weaker scores in the political aspects of budget preparation. The difference in means 
for the dimension related to “political involvement in the guidance on the preparation 
of budget submissions” is 1.24 (the difference between a D and B-, perhaps), which is 
significant at 0.01. Statistically significant differences in means also exceed one in 
regard to legislative approval of the budget, production of multi-year fiscal forecasts 
and existence of costed sector strategies. Every one of the fragile states scores a D in 
the dimension focused on producing multi-year sectoral strategies. Should we be 
surprised that countries in political turmoil are so far below their African counterparts 
in these political and policy dimensions? Should we expect anything more? 
66.  These questions are quite sobering, and actually make one inquire about the 
appropriateness of the PEFA dimensions in different contexts. PEFA stakeholders 
imply that their indicators are “objective measures of performance” that are 
“generally accepted as ‘best practice.’”
31 One has to ask, “Best practice for whom?” 
(A question frequently raised in the general critique of best practice literature itself.) 
Is the focus on developing a multi-year budget best or even appropriate in countries 
that recently failed to develop annual budgets? Is a strong emphasis on achieving 
political consensus and medium-term budget control through rational, top-down 
control mechanisms (like ceilings and multi-year projections, or sectoral strategies) 
really objectively accepted as best practice in emerging polities?
32 In PFM areas 
where political decisions are being made, it is important to remember that different 
political cultures, maturities and such may require different solutions at different 
times. The mechanisms implied in the PEFA dimensions may not work for Norway 
and may work even less for post conflict states.  
                                                 
31 PEFA Secretariat. 2008. PFM Performance Measurement Framework Monitoring Report 2007. p.27. 
32 Recent OECD studies show that some prominent countries do not even use ceilings as much as others do, 
relying on alternative political mechanisms for consensus and to ensure reliable fund flows to policy areas. 
Norway’s recent PFM-PR defends a D for the dimension related to multi-year forecasting and budgeting.   32
67.  The negative story of fragility’s impact on PFM systems, and also of the 
implications of weak politics on governance in general, has a positive side to it. More 
than two thirds of the African countries are not fragile but are enjoying stability, and 
the evidence suggests that stability delivers PFM progress. This is most noticeable in 
countries like Sierra-Leone which has emerged from fragility to a state of relatively 
strong PFM in five years (if one considers 2002 the end of the civil war). The current 
paper started with a reference to the fact that Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Finance was 
burnt down during the civil war, meaning that everything needed to be rebuilt. This 
opportunity to rebuild, and the political stability and economic growth recorded since 
2002 seem to have accommodated major PFM progress. One has to ask, “Is there a 
peculiar reform dividend post conflict countries can benefit from?” 
Can post-fragility yield reform dividends? 
68.  Country 11 is in a similar position to Sierra Leone; its experience also 
suggests some kind of peculiar post conflict reform dividend. Having emerged from 
civil turmoil in the mid-1990s, government leadership used the subsequent twelve 
years to create a first class league 5 African PFM system (See Figure 12). It appears 
that countries experiencing stability after periods of fragility may find peculiar 
opportunities to start ‘from scratch’ that others do not have. Mozambique and 
Madagascar are also somewhat examples of this, both being relatively strong PFM 
performers despite having experienced and/or emerged from turmoil within the past 
fifteen years. Mozambique did not start ‘from scratch’ however, building at least 
partly on the old Portuguese system it had inherited. Its PFM-PR notes now that the 
new reforms (particularly based on the SISTAFE Law and e-SISTAFE technology, 
which were adaptations of the Portuguese system) are being hampered by old ways of 
thinking: “If reforms are to be sustainable and to have impact over the long term, 
there is a clear and pressing need to break with past systems and approaches.” The 
citation refers to a reform problem Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith call “institutional 
dualism”;
33 situations where,  “Well intended legal, regulatory and procedural 
changes  often produce a shell of proper governance that has little bearing on how 
public decisions are actually made and implemented. Meanwhile, preexisting and 
deeply embedded understandings and practices survive and continue shaping the way 
people are ruled.”  
69.  It appears that Country 11 and Sierra Leone may not have faced the dualism 
problem as severely as others do, partly because they treated their emergence from 
fragility as an opportunity to modernize and do something new. In the absence of a 
pre-existing system and norms, they were able to build ‘from scratch’ and not in 
parallel to pre-existing mechanisms. This is an important potential comparative 
advantage such governments might have, and one currently fragile states should be 
attentive to. It is also relevant to the discussion of the role CSOs can play in PFM 
development in fragile states. Is this role potentially greater and more creative than in 
other settings, unfettered by past role paradigms? One sees CSOs and NGOs 
occupying spaces in sectoral projects in fragile countries that they did not in the past, 
                                                 
33 Brinkerhoff, D. and A. Goldsmith. 2005. “Institutional Dualism and International Development: A 
Revisionist Interpretation of Good Governance” Administration & Society, Vol. 37, pp.199-200 cited.   33
and still do not in many more stable settings. Box 4 cites examples of this, and 
potential opportunities for CSOs in the PFM domain.
 34   
 
CSOs play important roles in Cote d’Ivoire. The local branch of CARE manages the country’s Global 
Fund HIV project, aimed particularly at interventions in rebel controlled areas. Government has no 
reach in these areas, so it is an appropriate role for CARE. In managing the project, CARE is shoring 
up decentralized capacities in local entities that struggled previously, developing new supply chain and 
procurement processes, planning and monitoring mechanisms that might well become important bases 
for future financial management capacities in the health sector. 
Togo’s CSO engagements and economic growth experience have both been affected by its fragile state. 
Opportunities for CSO engagement in fragile states are quite different to those in growing, stable 
economies. The focus my be less on holding government to account and more on providing 
organizational frameworks and capacities and providing forums for political and policy deliberation. 
CSO roles will differ even across these settings, depending on historical tensions within societies 
themselves (and how CSOs might have been implicated in such). Countries vary in these respects, with 
CSO representatives in Togo believing that “government perceives civil society as part of the 
opposition, and considers the budget its private domain” thus limiting opportunities for engagement. 
Rwanda’s government is described as being “open to dialogue” with civil society. 
It is interesting to note just how much economic growth and governance reform can accelerate CSO 
opportunities for PFM engagement. The 2008 CIVICUS Civil Society Index for fast growing Ghana 
asks about CSO involvement in the budget process and in monitoring government.
1 The answers to 
both sections entail descriptions of 936 and 843 words respectively. Answers to the same questions 
number 230 and 295 words in the case of Sierra Leone, where per capita incomes have grown in the 
past ten years but only after declining for the ten years prior (such that the country is still not at its 1990 
levels). Togo’s  per capita income has reflected a negative trend almost continuously since 1990, 
falling 4 % in the last decade. CSO engagements in budget and monitoring activities are described in 
the CIVICUS database in only 65 and 92 words,
1 suggesting limited engagement.  
Economic growth is also bringing greater market and governance sophistication in many countries. 
While this creates opportunity for CSO engagement it also demands that the CSOs ramp up their own 
capacities and sophistication. A recent UNDP report on CSOs in Mozambique emphasizes the 
importance of “quality” in their engagement. It cites the role of the Fundação para o Dseenvolvimento 
da Comunidade (FDC) in mapping CSOs and building capacity for quality engagement. 
Box 4 – Different countries, different CSO opportunities and roles 
 
Economic growth and democratic reform across Africa has led to greater pressure for government 
accountability. Civil society is playing a growing role advocating such, on both the revenue and 
expenditure sides. EITI and Revenue Watch have empowered CSOs in countries like Nigeria, Gabon 
and Ghana to question government. The Integrated Social Development Center (ISODEC) in Ghana 
actively monitors government reporting on revenues as well as the tax code. CSOs are also emerging in 
the form of vibrant business coalitions in growing economies. Ghana’s BUSAC (Business Sector 
Advocacy Challenge Fund) provides policy analysis and advocacy services for business. Some business 
oriented CSOs in countries like Ghana and Burkina Faso adjust to represent interests of the 
disempowered as well. Burkina Faso’s Action for Development of Rural Women (GRADE-FRB) 
advocates for developing mechanisms that allow citizen participation in government decision-making. 
 
                                                 
34 As noted earlier, the evidence of CSO engagement was typically not identified in World Bank analytical 
products but rather through personal correspondence with civil society groups in specific countries. This 
correspondence was corroborated with published references of civil society engagement, in the media as 
well as—where possible—literature coming out of development organizations. References are available 
from the author.   34
D.    Fiscal states have stronger PFM systems 
70.  The Extractive Industries Transparency Inititaive (EITI) has been mentioned a 
number of times already, something indicative of the dependence many African 
countries have on revenues from extractive industries. Does PFM look different in 
countries with such dependence? The link between extractive industries and other 
economic and social characteristics is a popular research theme. Many might argue 
that the ‘resource curse’ associated with large natural resource deposits has a direct 
effect on economic growth and fragility prospects. Proposed economic growth and 
fragility impacts on PFM quality may be purely endogenous, therefore, driven by this 
underlying issue. Others argue that dependence on natural resources for government 
revenues undermines PFM and other governance reform prospects directly, however, 
and the fiscal sociology literature holds more broadly that all revenues not collected 
from citizens undermine the quality of governance. This literature differentiates 
between fiscal states (where most revenues are collected domestically from citizens) 
and rentier states (where revenues are accrued from external sources to which 
government is not accountable, including natural resources, trade taxes and even 
external donors).  
71.  In the study at hand four countries are classified as oil-rich (based on IMF 
classification)
35 while nineteen could be called rentier states because more than half 
of their government revenues come from non-domestic sources (mostly trade fees and 
taxes). Figure 20 shows which countries are classified fragile, rentier and resource 
(oil-rich rentier).  
Fig.20. Where are the rentier, oil-rich resource states? 
 
1 3 5 7 9 1 11 31 51 71 92 12 32 52 72 93 1
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League 1  League 2  League 5  League 4 
  
72.  Interestingly, none of the oil-rich (resource) states are fragile. However, 
eleven of the twelve governments in the bottom leagues 1 and 2 are rentier states 
(with more than half government revenues derived from external sources),
36 and all 
                                                 
35 Congo, Gabon and countries 18 and 20. IMF. 2007. Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa. 
IMF: Washington, D.C. 
36 Country 29 is the only fiscal state in these lower leagues.   35
six in league 1 are rentier states. The four oil-rich rentier states are in lower leagues. 
In contrast, all but one of the league 5 countries are more ‘fiscal’ in nature.
37  
73.  The evidence is thus apparent but not conclusive that a rentier state will have a 
weak PFM system and a fiscal state will have a stronger system. However, further 
evidence emerges in comparing PEFA dimension scores in fiscal states, rentier states 
(broadly defined as the nineteen mentioned above) and oil-rich countries (the four 
noted). In these comparisons rentier states’ average scores lag fiscal states in 63 out 
of 64 dimensions, and 22 of these differences in means are statistically significant. 
Oil-rich rentier states’ average scores lag fiscal states in 57 of the 64 dimensions, with 
18 statistically significant. At least half of the dimensions lagging in the case of the 
rentier states relate to monitoring, reporting and accountability mechanisms—the 
focal points of the EITI. Table 4 shows these (and other) lagging dimensions 
(clustering some under single bullets), centered on the lack of controls in budget 
execution (of all types in the broad rentier state group) and formal budget preparation 
mechanisms (in the oil-rich states).  
Table 4. Dimensions in which rentier states and oil-rich rentier states lag fiscal states 
Rentier states broadly defined lag behind other 
countries in statistically significant ways in respect of: 
 
Oil-rich rentier states lag behind other countries 
in statistically significant ways in respect of: 
 
• Comprehensiveness of budget documentation 
• Reporting on receipts from donors 
• Monitoring of AGAs and PEs 
• Monitoring and control of sub-nationals 
• Public access to information 
• Debt sustainability analysis prepared 
• Sectoral strategies prepared 
• Penalties for tax non-compliance 
• Tax audits and investigations 
• Cash flow forecasting 
• In-year budget adjustments 
• Authority to change HR records and payroll 
• Use of open competition in procurement 
• Process for resolving procurement complaints 
• Expenditure commitment controls 
• Quality of internal controls 
• Degree of compliance with internal controls 
• Frequency and coverage of internal audit reports 
•  Management response to internal audit findings 
• Regularity of bank reconciliations 
• Scope of in-year budget reports 
• Quality of information in in-year budget reports 
• Follow-up on external audit recommendations 
• Scope of legislature’s scrutiny 
•  Sub-national reporting 
•  Monitoring of AGAs and PEs 
•  Monitoring and control of sub-nationals 
•  Existence and adherence to budget calendar 
•  Clarity of political guidance in budget 
preparation (through formal mechanisms) 
•  Investments selected strategically 
•  Management response to internal audit 
findings 
•  Information provided on resources received by 
service delivery units 
•  Timeliness of submission of annual budget 
reports 
•  Timeliness of submission of audit reports to 
legislature 
 
 
74.  As with the other findings of this paper, this evidence is presented simply to 
suggest a thematic relationship between a certain country characteristic and the 
quality of PFM. In this case the theme is that fiscal states have stronger PFM 
                                                 
37 Although two of these are severely dependent on aid sources they were classified as fiscal because of 
growing domestic revenue collections in recent years.   36
systems. Showing a relationship does not explain why it exists, or even the direction 
of causality. Many would suggest the revenue source impacts on PFM quality. 
However, one can think of the relationship running in the other direction as well; 
rentier states may have low domestic revenue sources because of the weak 
governance systems in place. Regardless of which causal direction is in play, the 
evidence speaks of a relationship between rentier/fiscal state characteristic and PFM 
system quality. And it is reinforced by qualitative references in the PFM-PRs of 
sixteen of nineteen ‘rentier’ governments, which emphasize peculiar problems these 
settings have with issues of reliability, accountability and transparency. 
E.    Longer periods of reform commitment foster PFM progress 
75.  It is interesting that rentier states have shorter and weaker legacies of broad-
based national reform. Simultaneously, the evidence suggests that longer periods of 
broad reform commitment (reflected in time since first PRSP) foster PFM progress. 
The PRSP is used as a measure of broad reform commitment because it is routinely 
referenced in the PFM-PRs as a vital influence on PFM reform.
38 When omitting 
Mauritius from analysis (because it was not engaged in PRSP dialog at all) one finds 
61 out of 64 PEFA dimensions higher in countries with PRSPs older than 3 years as 
compared with countries having newer (or no) PRSPs. 24 of these differences in 
means are statistically significant. When comparing countries with PRSPs older than 
3 years against countries that had no or more recent PRSP at the time of PEFA 
assessment, one finds 62 dimensions lagging in the latter; 37 of these differences in 
means are statistically significant. Figure 21 shows how these dimensions cluster into 
process indexes and what differences in averages look like between the two groups. 
Fig.21. Comparing average process index scores, in country groups with different PRSP histories  
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Note: The dark arrows indicate statistical significance of the difference in means at 0.01; lighter arrows 
indicate statistical significance of the difference in means at 0.05. 
 
                                                 
38 Twenty one of the thirty one countries had PRSPs in place at time of writing the PFM-PR and all these 
countries mention the PRSP favorably, with seventeen locating PFM reforms within the PRSP context. 
Five countries that did not have PRSPs when the PFM-PR was written were either thinking about 
developing one (or an equivalent) or were in the process of finalizing one. These five countries also 
presented the PRSP as a central influence or catalyst or facilitator of PFM reform.    37
76.  The country group with PRSPs in place for 4 years or more yield significantly 
higher averages in 17 of 18 process areas. Fourteen of these differences in means are 
significant at 0.01. Those with a longer period of PRSP-driven reform score half a 
point or more above the others in 16 process areas, and more than one point above in 
two areas—in-year financial reporting and monitoring (with internal audit close to 
one as well). The extent to which newer and non-PRSP countries lag the others 
resonates with the startling impact of fragility on PFM system quality, but appears 
even greater. One has to wonder why and if this has anything to do with having a 
PRSP or is really reflective of something else? 
77.  Figure 21a. suggests the complexity of the situation, showing that lower 
league countries are mostly fragile and non-PRSP. They are also typically low 
economic growth countries. Thus, even though one might observe a PRSP theme 
independently of a fragility or economic growth theme, the three themes seem related.  
Fig. 21a. Years since PRSP, fragility, growth and league position 
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Note: ypcapgrow is 1996-2006 growth in income per capita, multiplied by 10 to facilitate easy comparison 
with the other series. 
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78.  At the very least the three themes seem to reinforce each other, but most likely 
they are all reflecting endogenous country characteristics that are still not effectively 
identified. The underlying variable might be some form of leadership that readily 
capitalizes on the opportunities provided (like HIPC or PRSP). The positive effect 
having a PRSP has on PFM quality thus reflects this longer-term government 
engagement in reform and not the PRSP presence itself (with the PRSP merely the 
tool used to lock policy and reform direction in). Many developed countries do not 
have PRSPs or multi-year national plans like PRSPs, partly because these 
governments ‘lock in’ their policy and reform programs in alternative ways, mostly 
emerging from the political process more directly (and arising from the development 
path established often decades earlier). The question is thus not whether a PRSP 
exists, but whether governmental actors have the ability to pursue one reform agenda 
for a period of time. The PRSP creates an opportunity to facilitate this and its 
existence is thus a useful proxy (of reform engagement) for researchers to use, but the   38
opportunity it provides must still be taken in practice. Country 6 is currently 
developing its second PRSP: One wonders if the country’s politicians and managers 
will better appropriate the initiative’s opportunities a second time around? 
79.  The same story of opportunity requiring appropriation can be told regarding 
potential the PRSP created for CSO engagement in PFM. The PRSP made room for 
CSO involvement in policy development and monitoring. In most instances CSO 
engagement was not as strong as many had hoped. However, in places like Uganda 
and Mozambique CSO experiences in these processes helped to catalyze umbrella 
CSOs. CSOs must appropriate these kinds of opportunities, as discussed in Box 5.
 39  
 
In 2004 Warren Krafchick of the International Budget Partnership implicitly identified decentralization 
as another opportunity area for CSOs, but one that needed to be taken with both hands. He commented 
that,
1 “The fact that decentralization is only happening now, sometimes without any planning, opens up 
a space for civil society to monitor and increase public participation. While the focus has been on 
decentralising services to increase the quality of services for poor regions and poor people, often the 
money has not been decentralised. Instead, decentralization sometimes helps the government to steer 
away from the political issue of social services. While participative budgets work at municipal level, 
for example at Porto Alegre, it doesn’t work at national or regional levels yet. There are good citizen 
participation practices around budget monitoring in India. The auditor general visits villages, and goes 
through the budget with citizens, line by line, at the end of each budgetary year. "More and more, 
governments are aware of the work we are doing. We are forcing the government to listen to us”. 
The EITI is likely to provide similar opportunities, even though it will probably produce more 
frustration than results for many CSOs. In 2006 Publish What You Pay (PWYP) identified, for 
example, problems with EITI including “the failure of several endorsing governments to recognize the 
central role of civil society organizations, intimidation and marginalization of civil society activists.” 
Earlier references provided examples of CSOs working under the EITI rubric even in the face of 
‘marginalizing’ governments (in Gabon), however, suggesting that CSOs like PWYP are learning to 
take advantage of the initiative as a vehicle—in all sorts of circumstances. 
Box 5 - CSOs as vehicles for engagement: Opportunities that must be appropriated 
 
The PRSP created opportunities for CSO engagement in policy development and monitoring. In many 
cases direct evidence of low CSO engagement in both kinds of activities upset many, who saw PRSP as 
another vehicle with little value for the CSO community. However, a softer view may be possible with 
a few years of experience, especially in countries where the PRSP actually survived its first few years. 
In Mozambique, for example, a 2003 assessment of participation in the PARPA concluded, “In the 
face of the observed experiences … it cannot be said that the PARPA's development and early 
implementation period reflects the kind of participation required in principle …” It went on to say that,  
“You cannot blame anyone if you think there was insufficient participation and consultation… When 
one talks about consultation…it depends upon what people have in mind.”
1 A variety of examples have 
been provided in this paper to show the vibrant CSO engagements in Mozambique now (in 2008). It 
should be appreciated that PRSP experiences—both good and bad—aided in the development of 
umbrella organizations like LINK, learning of lessons about the importance of CSOs having capacity to 
engage, etc. The PRSP may not have delivered immediately, therefore, but provided a vehicle that 
CSOs have used to learn through and grow. 
                                                 
39 As noted earlier, the evidence of CSO engagement was typically not identified in World Bank analytical 
products but rather through personal correspondence with civil society groups in specific countries. This 
correspondence was corroborated with published references of civil society engagement, in the media as 
well as—where possible—literature coming out of development organizations. References are available 
from the author.   39
F.    Colonial heritage matters (maybe) 
80.  Two of the four countries with six years of PRSP behind them are in 
Francophone Africa. The other two are in Anglophone countries. Seven out of the ten 
countries with no PRSP history (or working on a PRSP at time of PEFA assessment) 
were also Francophone. Does this suggest anything about the impact of colonial 
heritage on the propensity to reform and the likelihood to have high quality 
governance and PFM systems? Figure 22 provides evidence to assist an answer.It 
shows the location of Francophone countries (the black triangles) in respect of others 
(grey triangles), and the leagues discussed to date. One can see that the 16 French 
heritage countries have disproportionally high representation in league 1 (4 of 6) and 
disproportionately low representation in league 5 (only 2 of 6). The representation as 
a whole has these countries located mostly in the lower leagues but with some 
variation, suggesting they may perform worse as a group, but that at least four cases 
of higher-than-average performance infer the issue may not be colonial legacy—at 
least not predominantly.  
Fig.22. League locations of Francophone (in black) and non-Francophone countries 
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81.  A second source of data-based evidence comes from assessing differences 
between Francophone and other countries on PEFA’s 64 non-outcome and non-donor 
process dimensions. The average PEFA dimension scores for French heritage 
countries lag those of English heritage countries in 45 dimension areas, with 8 of 
these differences in mean being significant. The eight statistically significant lagging 
dimensions relate to the public availability of fiscal information, adherence to the 
budget calendar, internal audit coverage, timeliness and submission of audit reports, 
evidence of follow up on external audit reports, legislative hearings on audit findings 
and issuance of recommended actions by the legislature, and legislative scrutiny of 
external audit reports. External accountability dimensions (external audit and 
legislative audit review) are between 0.84 and 1.47 lower in Francophone countries, 
compared with Anglophones. This amounts to a one symbol difference and more; in 
the case of legislative hearings English heritage countries score 2.7 while French and 
Belgian heritage countries score 1.3. Figure 23 isolates these areas of difference,   40
showing how Francophone countries compare with Anglophone countries and those 
of Portuguese heritage.  
82.  The figure is presented to examine why Francophone countries perform so 
poorly in the downstream, external accountability areas. Readers should note that 
French heritage countries lag both other groups substantially in external audit and 
legislative audit review (as mentioned and shown in the dotted oval to the right). 
Interestingly, Francophone countries actually score higher than the other two on the 
legislative budget review index, raising some interesting questions about why the 
legislature would perform so well in these countries on one side of the budget and so 
poorly on the other. It would appear that, at least in this area (but maybe also in 
internal audit and other processes) colonial heritage matters a great deal. All of the 
francophone countries have been challenged to create anew or reform their external 
audit function in the past decade. The function did not resemble the kind reflected in 
PEFA, or the international audit and accounting approaches informing PEFA. 
Fig. 23. Comparing average process index scores, in country groups, by colonial heritage  
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Note: The dark arrows indicate statistical significance of the difference in means at 0.01; lighter arrows 
indicate statistical significance of the difference in means at 0.05. 
 
83.  The French system itself varies quite substantially from many of the 
‘objective’ ‘best practice’ criteria presented in PEFA.
40 The French legislature is 
significantly less engaged than many others, for example, as reflected in various 
recent assessments.
41 A few PFM-PRs incorporate discussion of the differences in 
these areas. In country 20’s PFM-PR, for example, a two page note relates a debate 
about the draft of the PEFA report, underlining problems in interpreting internal and 
external audit/control functions as performed in the nation, given PEFA guidelines. 
                                                 
40 And French countries mostly have to ensure their systems harmonize with the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union’s (WAEMU) texts on public finance. 
41 See Andrews, M. (2008) Good Government Means Different Things to Different Countries. Paper 
presented at 2008 American Political Science Association, Boston, MA    41
Donor comments responding to this discussion criticize the ‘mechanical approach’ of 
the PEFA methodology and its imposition of a standard not fitting with the context. 
84.  These kinds of comments are interesting, but there are also examples of 
Francophone countries (like Country 11) that have willingly adopted a path towards 
the kind of external audit and legislative engagements implied in PEFA. Further, it is 
unclear that some aspects of PEFA are more relevant for strong Westminster 
democracies—especially given that these countries traditionally have the weakest 
legislative engagements of all (with the UK, Canada and Australia weaker than 
France in these areas). Essentially, it would appear that conceptions of political 
engagement, oversight and control have deep historical roots, cultural meaning and 
political context that PEFA and other indicator sets will not be able to effectively 
consider. These differences potentially explain why countries like Belgium get onto 
slower paths towards internal audit development, for example,
42 and may explain the 
Francophone. The lags may also have nothing to do with colonial legacy, given that 
the weaker Francophone countries are also those with apparently more challenged 
political systems (characterized by low levels of PRSP adoption and fragility). 
G.    Summing the country-specific themes  
85.  As with process areas there are a variety of key PFM themes reflected across 
country experience in the sample of 31 African countries. While not presented as a 
theme, the central most important observation is that, Countries are in different PFM 
performance leagues. Five different leagues are identified, with countries in each 
differing in terms of process and outcomes performance. The difference between 
leagues 1 and 5 is substantial, equaling nearly two points. Using the PFM 
performance ladder metaphor, league 1 countries are just above the bottom rung 
whilst league 5 countries are just under the second highest rung. Countries in the 
different leagues have different characteristics, with the bottom leagues weak in most 
respects, the mid leagues strengthening their upstream, de jure and concentrated 
PEFA dimensions and the top leagues building on already strengthened upstream, de 
jure and concentrated dimensions to now focus on downstream, de facto and de-
concentrated areas. Interestingly, Figure 24 shows that countries within leagues also 
have commonalities in terms of the contextual variables identified: The higher bars on 
the right reflect more ‘positives’ in place (high growth, stability, fiscal state, policy 
commitment, not Francophone), apparently facilitating PFM reform and reform space 
and, ultimately, better PFM performance.  
                                                 
42 Andrews suggests reasons why Belgium stands out having lower internal audit coverage than other 
effective OECD governments. He cites a variety of path-related constraints (including) “differences in 
institutionalization of the internal audit profession … in the formation of professional institutes” weak 
talent bases [and the constraints posed by] differences in the “larger social and cultural context in which 
such talent is produced” and legal institutionalization … reflected in “the fact that internal audit was legally 
recognized and mandated as a public sector function at very different times in the governments—1978 in 
the United States and 2001 in the Netherlands” as well as “the importance of managerial acceptance of 
internal auditing as a function (especially the modern version) …[and] what this acceptance hinges on—
cultural awareness (and the professionalization issue already referenced), social and economic pressures to 
manage risks, risk and uncertainty avoidance, perhaps?” See Andrews, M. (2008) Good Government 
Means Different Things to Different Countries. Paper presented at 2008 American Political Science 
Association, Boston, MA.   42
Fig. 24. Country characteristics combine to impede, facilitate PFM across leagues 
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86.  The figure suggests quite strongly that an unmeasured, endogenous factor is at 
play, creating more space for PFM success in some countries than others. This paper 
aims to identify themes, not disentangle them, hence the job of working out which 
effects are predominant in influencing PFM; even if there is a common endogenous 
driver behind all of these must wait for other work.  
87.  The basic idea to take away is simply that country characteristics matter a 
great deal in understanding what PFM systems look like. Some countries are 
substantially ahead of others in a general sense because they fall on the positive side 
of all the themes identified. They are in the top leagues in Africa, climbing rungs at 
the very top of the PFM performance ladder (at least as this is defined in PEFA). 
Other countries find themselves struggling with contextual realities that put them on 
the negative side of the themes discussed. Their PFM processes and outcomes are 
weak, and they are in the bottom leagues, struggling to get past the lower rungs of the 
PFM performance ladder. These observations, and the themes underlying them, raise 
important questions for reformers, chief among these being, “Is context taken 
seriously in reform design?” 
   43
IV.   Themes from past reforms, ideas for the future 
 
88.  This query raises its own secondary questions: What kinds of reforms have 
countries pursued in the past decade (or more)? Where have reform ideas come from? 
What lessons can be learned from past approaches? What are the current challenges 
and how well do existing reform approaches address these? These questions drive this 
final section, which discusses themes emerging in reform experience across the 31 
African countries. The discussion has four major parts to it: The first two tell a story 
of interventions in which similarities belie country differences and where reforms do 
deliver better law and stronger central agencies, and lessons across leagues. The 
third part argues that existing reforms may fail to deliver more than legal and 
concentrated gains, however—particularly failing to meet current challenges. The 
fourth argues that adjustments are needed to meet emerging challenges.  
A.    Reform similarities belie country differences 
89.  Content analysis was the main method used in analyzing PFM reform 
experience across the 31 countries. PFM-PRs were used to guide content searches and 
CFAAs (and equivalents), project documents and IMF Country Reports were used for 
the actual analyses. The key words and acronyms included MTEF, program budgets, 
Classifications of the Functions of Government (COFOG) and Government Financial 
Statistics (GFS), budget ceilings, Treasury Single Accounts (TSA), Financial 
Management Information Systems (FMIS), commitment controls, and International 
Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS).  These are all technical PFM standards. 
90.   The content analysis shows them as standards in the African reform agendas: 
28 out of 31 countries have had MTEFs in place or are putting them in place; 25 are 
introducing some form of program, performance or activity-based budget; all refer to 
efforts to introduce GFS and COFOG classification schemes; 26 are using ceilings in 
some way in budget preparation; all refer to steps to create TSAs (or some kind of 
consolidated public accounts structure); 20 refer explicitly to FMIS/IFMS or some 
form of computerization in budget execution especially (and another 10 refer to the 
need for this); all mention commitment controls; all mention IPSAS or some other 
version of accounting standards (especially different for Francophone countries). 
91.  Searches also established that internal audit, external audit, procurement, 
payroll controls, internal controls and legislative issues were on the reform agenda (at 
least 80% of the time in all cases). The ubiquity of these reform mechanisms across 
such a varied set of countries (as discussed) suggests the presence of some kind of 
externally imposed model. Various authors explain the breadth of implementation of 
these mechanisms (like MTEF) in terms of their being a part of the development 
community’s global public finance reform approach.  Figure 25 shows in how these 
have been introduced in a number of the governments reviewed (at least in the stages 
that are most common to all governments; some have moved beyond these). All 
experiences overlap at least 60 percent with the stylized model presented. This is not 
to say that all interventions look the same in all places (MTEFs sometimes have less   44
of a focus on MDA planning, for example). It is simply to point out  that interventions 
are  similar, belying the significant variation in the country group. 
 
Fig. 25. A stylized version of common reform elements across the 31 country sample 
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92.  The strongest evidence of reform similarity is reflected in the comparison of 
agendas in league 1 and league 5 countries. The leagues were shown earlier to be 
significantly different. However, they have alarmingly similar reforms in place, 
shown in Table 5 which provides evidence of four interventions in the league 1 and 5 
countries: PFM Laws; MTEF; Treasury Systems (TS); and Central Treasuries (CT). 
   45
Table 5. Different leagues, similar reforms 
League 5  League 1 
•  Mauritius [PFM Laws; MTEF; TS; CT] 
•  Burkina Faso  [PFM Laws; MTEF; TS; CT] 
•  Ethiopia [PFM Laws; MTEF; TS; CT] 
•  Mozambique [PFM Laws; MTEF; TS; CT] 
•  Country 11 [PFM Laws; MTEF; TS; CT] 
 
•  Country 15 [PFM Laws; MTEF; TS; CT] 
•  Gabon [PFM Laws; MTEF; TS; CT] 
•  Country 19 [PFM Laws; MTEF] 
•  Country 5 [PFM Laws; TS; CT] 
•  Country 6 [PFM Laws; MTEF; TS; CT] 
•  Country 2 [PFM Laws; MTEF; TS; CT] 
B.    Existing reforms can deliver better law, stronger central agencies 
93.  Beyond the commonness of reform terminology and typology, the evidence 
speaks to common reform modalities and gains. In particular, across all countries, 
PFM reforms have tended to focus on and succeed most in (i) formalizing PFM 
processes through new laws and procedures,  and  (ii) strengthening central, 
concentrated entities (like treasuries, debt and budget departments, even recently 
procurement and internal audit regulatory agencies). Countries have stronger 
performance in these areas also, ostensibly reflecting (at least partly) reform impact. 
94.  The analysis of documented reform descriptions unearths an emphasis on 
procedural interventions in and through specific, concentrated sets of actors in all 31 
countries. The reform emphasis on concentrated entities and procedural reforms 
reflects itself in the kinds of system strengths observed through earlier analysis. 
Figure 26 shows the average scores of League 1, 3 and 5 countries on four types of 
PFM dimension: de jure, concentrated; de jure, de-concentrated, de-facto, 
concentrated; and de-facto, de-concentrated.  
Fig.26. How three leagues perform on different PFM dimension types 
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95.  Dimensions involving concentrated role players account for the highest 
averages in all three leagues.  The highest scoring dimensions in all leagues are those 
involving (directly) the engagement of the budget department, treasury, revenue 
regulatory agency, and such. Readers should note that even de-facto, concentrated 
scores are relatively high for all groups—suggesting that the implementation gap may   46
be overcome when the responsible implementer is a concentrated actor. One cannot 
make a direct connection between reforms and the average scores in Figure 26, given 
the lack of any information about prior states, but we can surmise that the areas of 
common strength in all settings reflect domains where reforms are most successful, 
and areas of weakness reflect reform limits. Interestingly enough, the areas of 
strength and reform impact are reflective of reform design as discussed. Reforms 
focus on concentrated groups which seem to deliver the best results. Reforms tend to 
emphasize legal and procedural de jure change, apparently reflected positively in the 
relative strength of these types of dimensions (at least in leagues 3 and 5). 
Can countries learn from each other about strengthening dimensions? 
96.  Figure 26 shows more than the proclivity all countries’ reform agendas have 
for strengthening laws and central agencies. It also shows that some countries have 
progressed further than others on these and other PFM dimensions. League 5 
countries average stronger scores than league 3 countries in all dimension categories 
shown in the figure. League 3 similarly outscores league 1 in all categories. One 
wonders why, and if higher league countries can offer lower league countries lessons 
on how they could progress up the PFM development ladder?  
97.  Figure 27 illustrates this idea, showing that higher leagues record a greater 
number of average scores at top rungs of a proverbial PFM development ladder than 
others. League 5 countries average between 2.5 and 4 in 57 out of 64 dimensions; 
league 3 countries average 1.5 to 2.5 in 56 out of 64 dimensions; league 5 countries 
average between 1 and 1.5 in 52 out of 64 dimensions. Surely league 1 can learn from 
league 3 countries how to translate some of its 1 and 1.5 averages into 2’s and 2.5’s? 
And surely league 3 countries can glean some lessons from league 5 countries that 
could lead to more averages creeping up from 1.5 and 2 to 2.5 and 3? 
Fig.27. How leagues perform on the PFM development ladder 
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98.  The lessons one can glean from a PEFA-like database are cross sectional and 
not temporal—speaking to differences between countries and country groups and not 
necessarily to stories about why those differences came about. The lessons are also 
centered on how to improve PEFA scores (moving up the scorecard rungs shown in 
Figure 27), not necessarily PFM practice.  The lessons center on a benchmarking 
approach, whereby different scores in different leagues tell us about the opportunities 
and constraints lower league countries might face when trying to reform individual 
PFM dimensions. In some dimensions lower league averages are close to the averages 
of higher leagues, as with leagues 1 and 3 in PI-21.i and PI-21.ii in Figure 28; and 
some of the lower league countries actually score the same as some of the higher 
league countries (yielding a statistically insignificant difference in means, suggested 
in the lack of any hard arrow between the league averages).  
Fig. 28. How differences in league performance can point to reform opportunities 
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99.  These dimensions seem to provide opportunities for lower league countries to 
improve and climb the rungs of the PFM development ladder. Other dimensions 
speak to a more sobering reality: lower league averages are much lower than higher 
league averages, like with leagues 1 and 3 in regard to PI-20.i and leagues 3 and 5 in 
relation to PI-21.i;
43 very few lower league countries score anywhere near the 
                                                 
43 League 1 countries average just above 1 for PI-20.i—the existence and effectiveness of commitment 
controls. This indicates that, on average, commitment control systems are generally lacking or are routinely 
violated in these countries. League 3 countries average just above 2, indicating that the countries are 
characterized (on average) as having expenditure commitment control procedures which are partially 
effective, but that may not comprehensively cover all expenditures or may occasionally be violated. League 
5 countries average at a 3, meaning that (again, on average) expenditure commitment controls are in place 
and effectively limit commitments to actual cash availability and approved budget allocations for most 
types of expenditure, with minor areas of exception. League 3 countries are 0.98 above league 1 countries   48
countries in higher leagues in these dimensions (yielding a statistically significant 
difference in means, suggested by the hard arrows between the two averages in these 
dimensions). Lower league countries will probably have greater difficulty closing the 
gap with higher league countries when it comes to these dimensions. 
100.  This approach allows one to identify what could be called the ‘lower hanging’ 
and ‘higher hanging’ fruit for reformers in leagues 1 and 3, respectively. Figure 29 
summarizes these for league 3, showing the low hanging fruit dimensions in green 
and higher hanging fruit dimensions in yellow (pink denotes dimensions where 
league 3 actually averages the same or more than league 5).  
Figure 28. Opportunities league 3 countries have of improving to league 5 standards 
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101.  The 33 low hanging fruit reform options identified for league 3 countries can 
be separated according to the size of the lag behind league 5 (and thus the amount of 
ground reformers need to make up) and the PFM development ladder location (some 
involve climbing from the first to second rung while others involve moving from a 
second to third). The ten dimensions with the smallest lags between leagues 3 and 5 
are shown in Table 6, which also describes the ‘rung’ league 3 countries would need 
                                                                                                                                                 
on average, and the difference is statistically significant—meaning that most if not all league 1 countries 
score below league 3 countries on the dimension. In contrast, league 5 countries may be 0.86 above league 
3 countries, but the difference is not significant: 4 of 6 league 5 countries and 5 of 7 league 3 countries 
score similarly (mostly 3) on the dimension.     49
to master to effect gains. Different countries in league 3 will be motivated to improve 
different dimensions, as in all cases some countries have already reached higher rungs 
(showing it can be done). In regard to PI-13.i, for example, five of the seven league 3 
countries are already scoring 3 or higher (the average in league 5) but Malawi, 
Uganda and Benin are still scoring 2 (a PEFA C). In regard to PI-12.iii Malawi and 
Congo lag significantly behind the rest of the group (scoring lowly 1s) and Cameroon 
and Senegal are lagging slightly (with 2s). All four countries should be inspired that 3 
of their league members score higher 3s on this dimension, and that this is around the 
same score as league 5’s average. 
Table 6. Potential low hanging fruit areas of reform for league 3 countries 
Dimension number and description   Which rung do league 3 countries need to reach next, and how is this 
described in PEFA? 
PI-13.i. Clarity and comprehensiveness 
of tax liabilities 
3 (PEFA B): Legislation and procedures for most, but not necessarily all, 
major taxes are comprehensive and clear, with fairly limited discretionary 
powers of the government entities involved. 
PI-12.iii. Existence of sector strategies 
with multi-year costing of recurrent and 
investment expenditure. 
2.5 (Between a PEFA C and B): Statements of sector strategies exist for 
between 25% and 75% of primary expenditures, with increasing levels of 
costing (full costing required for a B).  
PI-11.ii. Clarity/comprehensiveness of 
and political involvement in the 
guidance on the preparation of budget 
submissions.  
3 (PEFA B): A comprehensive and clear budget circular is issued to 
MDAs, which reflects ceilings approved by Cabinet (or equivalent). This 
approval takes place after the circular distribution to MDAs, but before 
MDAs have completed their submission. 
PI-17.i. Quality of debt data recording 
and reporting 
3 (PEFA B): Domestic and foreign debt records are complete, updated and 
reconciled quarterly. Data considered of fairly high standard, but minor 
reconciliation problems occur. Comprehensive management and statistical 
reports are produced at least annually. 
PI-6. Comprehensiveness of information 
included in budget documentation 
3 (PEFA B): Recent budget documentation fulfils 5-6 of the 9 information 
benchmarks. 
PI-13.ii. Taxpayer access to information 
on tax liabilities and administrative 
procedures. 
3 (PEFA B): Taxpayers have easy access to comprehensive, user friendly 
and up-to-date information on tax liabilities and administrative procedures 
for some major taxes, while for other taxes the information is limited. 
PI-17.iii. Systems for contracting loans 
and issuance of guarantees. 
3 (PEFA B): Central government’s contracting of loans and issuance of 
guarantees are made within limits for total debt and total guarantees, and 
always approved by a single responsible government entity. 
PI-5. Classification of the budget  3 (PEFA B): The budget formulation and execution is based on 
administrative, economic and functional classification (using at least the 10 
main COFOG functions), using GFS/COFOG standards or a standard that 
can produce consistent documentation according to those standards. 
PI-11.iii. Timely budget approval by the 
legislature or similarly mandated body 
(within the last three years). 
3.5 (Between a PEFA A and B): The legislature approves the budget before 
the start of the fiscal year, but a delay of up to two months has happened in 
one of the last three years (no delays for an A). 
PI-16.i. Extent to which cash flows are 
forecast and monitored. 
3.5 (Between a PEFA A and B): A cash flow forecast is prepared for the 
fiscal year, and updated monthly (or quarterly) on the basis of actual flows. 
102.    It is interesting to note that league 3 countries have more low hanging fruit 
opportunities in upstream dimensions and dimensions related to the management of 
inflows (taxes and debt particularly). 21 of the 33 opportunities that seem accessible 
gains fall into this area, reflected in the concentration of green in the budget 
preparation and inflows boxes in Figure 28. The dimensions seem to be lower 
hanging fruit because they build on already-established capacities—with most league   50
3 countries having stronger upstream foundations and weaker building blocks in the 
downstream. Similarly, 16 of the 33 ‘accessible’ gains involve further steps to 
strengthen laws and 18 involve primary engagement of concentrated actors, two more 
capacities league 3 countries are able to build on. Many of the lower hanging   
opportunities are also in clusters of PFM dimensions with high visibility to donors, 
foreign investors and domestic taxpayers:
44  
•  Formalizing the budget preparation process, including legislative engagement, 
•  Clarifying and formalizing the tax process,  
•  Formalizing and strengthening debt management, and  
•  Improving reporting.  
103.  Interestingly, league 1 has fewer lower hanging fruit prospects and those that 
do exist are more randomly located around the PFM system, as shown in Figure 29. 
Figure 29. League 1 opportunities of improving to league 3 standards 
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statistically significant differences between league 1 and league 3 scores; Pink denotes dimensions 
where league 1 scores already match league 3 scores. 
                                                 
44 The proposed next steps for league 3 countries on dimension 5 relate to further formalizing the budget 
formulation process by adopting a more policy-oriented classification scheme (based on functions) that 
facilitates external engagement, for example; improvement on dimension 6 involves building on a growing 
record of publishing budgetary documents to be even more open; dimensions 11.i, 11.ii, and 11.iii will all 
be strengthened if governments just continue formalizing their budget preparation processes (with laws 
and procedures that outsiders can see are being taken seriously); dimensions 13.i, 13.ii, 13.iii and 14.ii and 
14.iii all pertain to steps that add to the growing formality and clarity in taxation processes, and even 23 
and 26i and 26ii relate to the way governments report to outsiders and thus engage with important 
stakeholders (like business, donors and—one hopes—civil society).     51
104.  League 1 countries’ averages are close to league 3 averages, and not 
significantly different, in 23 dimension areas—Figure 29’s green ‘low hanging fruit’. 
8 of these dimensions are in the upstream or revenue management areas, while 15 are 
in the execution and external accountability process areas, spread quite evenly across 
resource management, internal audit, accounts and reporting, external audit and 
legislative audit analysis. Only 6 of the 23 more accessible gains relate to de jure 
interventions while 16 relate to de facto PFM progress, which includes preparing 
annual financial statements and making these available for audit within 15 months of 
the end of the fiscal year (25.i and 25.ii), and improving reporting of extra-budgetary 
expenditures, such that the size of unreported spending drops to between 5 and 10 % 
of total expenditure (7.i).    
105.  The relatively low number of de jure interventions captured as ‘low hanging 
fruit’ for league 1 countries could reflect the apparent difficulty of developing laws in 
fragile countries (which most league 1 countries are). The quality of laws in these 
settings is often much weaker than in other countries, but the path to create laws is 
complicated by weaknesses in the political system through which laws can be 
developed. The opportunity cost of introducing new laws is also high, given the weak 
legal system through which such laws are enforced. This means that PFM reform in 
such settings may have to focus on de facto elements where in other places it might 
have a more natural de jure starting point. Beyond this important observation, one 
should note that most of the easier-to-close gaps between league 1 and league 3 
countries are in dimensions where league 3 is weak rather than where league 1 is 
strong. This is one of the reasons why so many de facto, downstream dimensions 
feature in green in Figure 29; the potential to be like league 3 emerges because league 
3 has not gotten far with these downstream, de-facto and de-concentrated dimensions 
(shown in the short spotted bars to the right of Figure 30).   
Fig. 30. Differences between leagues, by dimension type 
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106.  The 31 yellow shaded areas in Figure 29, which show the dimensions where 
league 3 is significantly ahead of league 1, tend to reflect league 3 strengths (the taller   52
spotted bars at left of Figure 30): 16 are in the upstream, 18 are related to de jure 
dimensions and 15 involve concentrated actors. These are the ‘high hanging fruit’ that 
league 1 countries will probably struggle to reach through reforms (given the major 
lag in scores right now and the fact that few league 1 countries score anywhere near 
league 3 countries in these dimensions). Interestingly, these are the very areas that 
reforms in all countries are focused on (as discussed)—upstream dimensions that are 
de jure in nature and involve concentrated actors. Are they the right starting point for 
league 1 countries? Could more de facto interventions be more practical and offer 
higher gains? 
107.  League 3 countries will likely benefit from the de jure, concentrated type 
reforms in the short run, given the number of low hanging reform opportunities in 
such dimension areas. But the high hanging fruit for league 3 countries (shown in 
yellow in Figure 28) is of a different type: 17 of 19 are in the downstream, 14 of 19 
are de facto and 13 involve de-concentrated actors. It is precisely these kinds of 
dimensions that separate league 3 and league 5 countries (reflected in the large 
differences in means and tall black bars at right of Figure 30). These are also the 
dimensions that diagnostics suggest league 3 countries should be most concerned 
about; the locus of major weakness in budget execution and accountability.  This is 
borne out in Figure 31, where one can see the average scores each league achieved for 
different process areas. The bold figures indicate that the league in question averaged 
significantly higher scores than the one preceding it (a ‘high hanging fruit’ 
difference).  
Fig. 31. Average scores in different process areas, by league 
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108.  When looking at the non-inflow (tax, debt and donor) downstream (from 
managing cash through to external accountability), league 5 is significantly ahead of 
league 3 in ten out of twelve process areas (internal control and accounts 
reconciliation being the two exceptions). League 3 is only significantly ahead of 
league 1 in 4 of these twelve areas (and league 1 countries average similar scores or 
even better scores in the other 8 process areas, including monitoring and external 
audit). Many of the downstream dimensions in which leagues 1 and 3 are so weak are 
de facto in nature (requiring behavioral adjustments) and involve de-concentrated 
actors. Will current reform designs assist these countries in strengthening such 
dimensions, or will ‘higher hanging’ fruit opportunities prove ‘too high’?  
C.    Getting past reform limits: Some theory and ideas 
109.  The question could be re-stated: “Can league 3 countries overcome reform 
limits to really improve downstream, de facto, de-concentrated dimensions?” Stories 
from higher league countries like Madagascar suggest similar reform limits, manifest 
in differences between strengths of upstream and downstream processes and contrasts 
between major legal advances and implementation concerns. Consider, as an 
example, “Madagascar [a league 4 country, which] recently deployed important 
efforts to improve its public financial management. All the legal texts were revised. 
The results of these reforms are however mitigated.” The pressing question is whether 
the prevailing reform approach, focused on a fairly common model shown in Figure 
25, will help Madagascar address its challenges and yield de-facto gains through de-
concentrated entities? At the same time Figure 31 reminds us that some countries in 
lower leagues are not in the same position as Madagascar, and these may actually 
face very different challenges: Will the current reform approach help meet the PFM 
challenges in league 1 and league 3 countries as well? 
110.  This section does not provide final answers to either question, but raises 
concerns that lean towards negative responses. These emerge from observing the 
proclivity towards adopting common PFM models in Africa, which reflects a 
tendency organizations have of imitating characteristics that are generally considered 
effective—what new institutionalists call isomorphism.
45 Isomorphism implies that 
common reforms are assumed to provide a rational means to attain desirable ends—
especially organizational legitimacy in external settings.
46 The use of terms like ‘best 
practice’, ‘good practice’ and ‘international standards’ are often associated with this 
assumption. Common paths of reform influence involve coercive, mimetic or 
normative pressures exerted on actors. All three types of pressure are likely in play in 
Africa and have much greater influence on central, concentrated actor sets than 
others. These actors are more engaged with donors (often the source of coercive 
pressure), enjoy more access to external ideas and examples underlying the reform 
                                                 
45 Meyer, J. and B. Rowan. 1991. “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and 
Ceremony.” In DiMaggio, P and W. Powell (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. P. 
J. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 340-363; citation from page 340. 
46 Isomorphism is increasingly used as a theoretical approach to explain development in the accounting 
profession. For  a recent example, see Lima Rodrigues, Lúcia and Russell Craig. 2007.  Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, Volume 18, Issue 6, pp. 739-757. Olowo-Okere and Tomkins (1998) also 
reference isomorphism in their effort to describe the path towards controls adoption in Nigeria.   54
model we see being mimicked, and are commonly engaged in professional groupings 
where norms favoring reforms emerge.  If actors in de-concentrated settings are less 
influenced by these pressures, can we expect them to adopt the reforms?  
111.  Research also asks about the kinds of impact external isomorphic influences 
can have on the way organizations work. Hannan and Freeman point to potential 
limits to isomorphic influence, arguing that pressures from outside an organizational 
environment might alter an organization’s “periphery” but often leave its “core” 
intact.
47 The periphery is typically composed of laws, regulations, structures and 
processes whilst the core is defined as embodying an organization’s identity and 
value system, the basis of de-facto engagement. Hannan and Freeman would probably 
argue that externally imposed PFM models in Africa might be limited to achieving 
legal, procedural adjustments at the periphery, not de facto core behavior.  
112.  Figure 32 illustrates both arguments in the current context. It shows that 
external reform ideas might convey isomorphically to central, concentrated entities 
(connected by solid arrows). These entities are likely to adopt such ideas as changes 
to their periphery and also their core. Treasury directors will introduce new 
accounting standards in theory and try to ensure they become practice, because they 
have a normative affinity with them. The ideas do not convey as well to de-
concentrated entities, however, because these are less influenced by coercive, 
mimetic and normative pressures at left in the figure (where arrows are no longer 
solid, suggesting limited reach). Where de-concentrated entities adopt these ideas, 
however, it is likely more on the periphery than in the core The top de jure 
dimensions rather than the bottom de facto dimensions).
48  
Fig. 32. Limits of the current reform model 
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113.  Figure 32’s story can be told as a simple analogy: A soccer game is being 
officiated by a concentrated group of referees who know and agree with the rules and 
have introduced them to all of the players; but the players are used to playing by other 
rules, do not really understand or accept the new rules and procedures, do not 
                                                 
47 Hannan, M. T., and J. Freeman. 1984. Structural inertia and organizational change. American 
Sociological Review 49:149–64.Reference to page 155. 
48 Dimensions involving de-concentrated actor sets average 2.8, 2.3 and 1.6 (for league 5, 3 and 1 
countries) when reflecting de-jure issues at the periphery—introducing the formal role of ‘internal auditor’ 
and producing nominal internal audit reports, for example—as compared with 2.4, 1.7 and 1.3 averages for 
de-concentrated dimensions impacting de facto behavior “core” to the organization—like actually using 
internal audit reports. 
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necessarily have abilities to comply, and are influenced by their pre-existing informal 
approaches that essentially authorize them to continue playing according to 
established rules; the new rules are thus not properly followed and the game, while 
reflecting new ideas in a peripheral sense, is actually being played according to the 
old conventions. The story is encapsulated in the earlier ideas of ‘institutional 
dualism’ which suggested that the challenge of reform is often greatest when it comes 
to substituting new ideas for old. 
114.  Figure 32 shows the extent of this problem for reformers, through the number 
of PEFA PFM dimensions falling in the different reform reach areas. Only 25 in total 
pertain to engagements with concentrated entities, where existing reform approaches 
are most effective. Almost half of the 64 are in the area reflecting the “core” de facto 
engagements of de-concentrated actors—the area with weakest ‘reach’ of current 
reform approaches. Existing reforms will not likely deliver results in these areas.  
D.    Reform adjustments are needed to meet looming challenges 
115.  The extent to which current reform modalities may be limited is certainly 
cause for concern. If the argument is right, reform adjustments are needed to meet 
looming challenges. But what of those who might argue that the translation of de jure 
to de facto, and from concentrated to de-concentrated simply requires more time than 
reforms have had to date? Such argument might also point out that these reform ideas 
have been adopted in practice across many governments; observers might reference 
countries from which the ideas were drawn as examples. It is impossible to 
definitively counter such claims. But evidence suggests they are qualified at best. 
Time has not proven the simple solution with MTEF reform in countries whose 
reforms date back ten years, for example. Ghana, Tanzania and country 6 still score 
Cs and Ds on MTEF related dimensions. Similar examples could be provided related 
to accounting, audit and other reforms which have progressed with concentrated 
engagement but not in de-concentrated actor groups. Furthermore, the argument that 
other countries have successfully adopted many innovations shown in Figure 25 is 
exaggerated.  Finally, countries that do exhibit successful adoption of these ideas also 
exhibit very different modernization paths. The lessons one can learn from these 
paths point to important adjustments necessary for African reform. 
116.  Whether one looks at Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom or 
Western European and Scandinavian countries, one finds a tendency for laws, 
processes and standards to emerge and morph over long periods of time, along 
domestic paths of development. A path of progress in the normative “core” paved the 
way for adjustments to “peripheral” practices. One finds the creation of accounting 
professions preceding modernization of PFM systems by twenty or thirty years, for 
example, of social demand for rational and accountable government leading the 
supply of such, and of social norms leading legal developments. As an example, Box 
6 discusses events in the United States that led up to 1920s legal and structural, 
suggesting that the social soil developed progressively prior to reform. Few observers 
would imagine the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act emerging without the preceding 
paths of preparation in the accounting profession, business sector, and government.     56
 
In many respects African countries find themselves at the same place as America in the 1900-1920 
period: Rwanda has just created its Institute of Certified Public Accountants (2008), Benin’s OECCA 
was founded in 2006 and has 45 members, Burkina Faso’s ONECCA emerged in 1996 and has 54 
members, Ghana has over 1,000 professional accountants though they are still earning their legitimacy. 
One can also consider similarities in dependence on trade taxes, the challenges of major urbanization, 
and such. But African countries are encouraged to develop systems adopted in the United States and 
other settings in the late 20
th and even 21
st century. Including advanced accounting reforms, systems 
and MTEFs. How feasible is this? Will the far less developed soil hold the more developed plants?   
Various Congressmen were emboldened by this experience and supported steps to reform the federal 
system, culminating in the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act, which centralized the budgeting system in 
the executive—specifically in the Bureau of the Budget. The Act ushered in a PFM era that some call 
the control phase, which ran from 1920 to 1935.  The phase embodied the policy values of the 
Progressive era: accountability, executive leadership, and professionalism, and saw the Bureau of the 
Budget (BoB) populated predominantly by accountants, emphasizing efficiency and economy above all 
else. The Act also established a Supreme Audit Institution, clarified the accountability of budget heads 
in agencies and re-emphasized the importance of the single appropriations committee in Congress. 
These accountants formed professional associations, leading to the creation of the American Institute of 
Accounting in 1917. Their concentration in New York was one of the reasons the city developed its 
Bureau of Municipal Research in 1906. The Bureau introduced the scientific accounting approach, 
opened a school of administration and was responsible for publishing early texts. Influenced by these 
advancements (and similar developments in the private sector), the Taft Commission Report (1912) 
called for a more formal budgeting process at the federal level of government. The country also 
transitioned to a domestic income tax at this time (1913) which led to greater levels of domestic 
revenue dependence. Various states modernized their budgeting systems in the period as well: From 
1911 to 1919 forty four states enacted budget laws. California and Wisconsin were the first to pass such 
a law, in 1911. Arkansas, Ohio and Oregon followed. Then in 1915 seven more states passed budget 
laws, in 1916 four, in 1917 seven, in 1918 six, and in 1919 fifteen states adopted budgetary control.   
Box 6 – Are PFM reforms 21
st century plants in nineteenth century soil? 
 
Many trace the beginnings of modern PFM in the United States to the 1921 Budget and Accounting 
Act. In reality the story starts in the eighteen century, but for brevity this short piece begins in 1887. It 
was at this time that the American Association of Public Accountants (AAPA) was incorporated, even 
before an 1896 state law in New York first recognized the profession.  There were only 250 Certified 
Public Accountants in the United States in 1900, and although some colleges had taught book-keeping 
as part of degree programs in the 19
th century, no American colleges recognized accounting as a major 
field in 1900. But the profession was growing, as referenced in an Editorial in the 1900 Public 
Accountant: “The profession is slowly, but surely forcing itself into its proper place among the other 
professions…” The period between 1900 and 1920 saw major advances in this area; By 1920 over 
5,000 original certificates had been issued.”   
 
117.  Salvatore Schiavo-Campo recently commented (in discussing MTEFs) that “A 
public management innovation cannot be transplanted as is to a different institutional 
soil … nor implemented successfully except gradually and over a long period of 
time.”
49 A key observation here is that reforms emerge most successfully when they 
develop from within. Even though external accounting ideas were introduced into the 
United States from the United Kingdom, for example, they were ultimately honed and 
adjusted and fitted to the local context before being introduced into government. 
                                                 
49 Schiavo-Campo, S. 2008. Of Mountains and Molehills: “The” Medium-Term Expenditure Framework. Paper 
presented at the Conference on Sustainability and Efficiency in Managing Public Expenditures Organized by the East-
West Center and Korea Development Institute Honolulu, Hawaii, 24-25 July 2008.   57
Their value was normatively approved over a long period of time, creating ‘space’ for 
reform. What does that space look like in Africa? Is it sufficient to facilitate de-facto 
implementation of new reforms? Consider just the accounting element, and the kind 
of soil Africa’s PFM reforms are planting advanced accounting products into:  
•  Sierra Leone, which has developed a raft of PFM laws recently, has a financial 
market described as “rudimentary” and an accounting profession with only 91 
members (in 2006). There is a lack of normative appreciation and acceptance of 
accounting and auditing in the country, with public perception that “the audit 
profession…does not add value.”  
•  Ethiopia, with its elaborate public accounting reforms, new computerized systems 
and accounting classifications also has an immature accounting profession, with 
an estimated cadre of only 200 professional accountants in the country.  
•  Rwanda has recently adopted accounting laws based on international standards, 
even though it has an extremely small supply of accounting professionals; only 
123 of the 263 accountant posts are filled and only 65 internal auditors even exist 
in the. The Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Rwanda was created by 
the Ministry of Finance only in August, 2008. 
118.  Readers should note that the achievements in these and other countries are 
immense, and initiating and ramping up the development of accounting professions 
has been a very positive PFM reform step for these countries. However, the relative 
youth of these professions suggests that one should not just assume that advanced 
accounting, MTEF, internal audit or other reforms will grow and mature and become 
“core” in these countries, given the limited soil. One can look beyond accounting and 
raise questions about the ‘fit’ between formal PFM reforms and informal African 
realities in general. Schick suggests, for example, that the problem with developing 
countries is not the lack of law, but the coexistence of dual systems—legal and 
informal—in most areas of society. The situation is reflected in Mauritius, whose 
formal bureaucracy receives high marks for being merit based and efficient but where 
accounts of actual bureaucratic structures suggest a different, more informal reality.
50 
Laws provide a peripheral structure that is not reflected in core behavior. Marcel 
Fafchamps shows that actual practices differ from formal rules in Africa’s private 
sector as well, with Ghanaian firms contracting through informal relational ties more 
readily than formal, legal mechanisms, even though these exist.
51  
119.  If the context does not provide the soil in which every-day laws are turned 
into practice, what chance is there for PFM reforms that are themselves legal in 
nature? Such comment is not intended to discourage African reformers, whose 
courage is exemplary (with the example of Rwanda in Box 6 being an example of 
such, and also of amazing progress). This discussion just reinforces how substantial 
some of these initiatives are, and why implementation is so hard. The reforms are 
aptly described in one case as “daunting for any well-resourced OECD Government.”  
                                                 
50 McCourt, W. and A. Ramgutty-Wong. 2003. “Limits to strategic HRM: the case of the Mauritian civil 
service” International Journal of Human Resource Management 14, 4, 600-618. Reference page 609.  
51 Fafchamps, M. 1996. The enforcement of commercial contracts in Ghana. World Development, Volume 
24, Issue 3, pp. 427-448.   58
The fact for countries in this situation is that “Many of the reforms have still to be 
completed and/or substantially implemented”  in situations “where these have not 
previously existed and where there is little tradition” supporting them. Country 11’s 
PFM-PR appropriately calls this “an achievement in itself” but readers should ask: 
Without the tradition (or soil, or space) will these new mechanisms really stand a 
chance of being “completed and/or substantially implemented”? 
120.  Given the limits of the current reform model and the themes apparent in 
African PFM it is certain that reforms will need adjustment to facilitate a positive 
answer to this question. The following three reform directions are presented as 
starting points for such adjustment, given the PFM themes observed, hypothesized 
limits of current reforms, and experience in more advanced reformers. The 
presentation includes discussion of steps some leading reformers are taking in these 
three directions:  
•  Reforms need less focus on technicalities, more on ‘space’. 
•  Reforms need less concentration, more coverage. 
•  Reforms need less similarity, more context-appropriateness. 
Direction 1.  Reforms need less focus on technicalities, more on ‘space’ 
121.  An earlier observed PFM theme noted that dimensions involving central, 
concentrated entities were stronger than dimensions involving many de-concentrated 
entities. It is important to credit reform designs in regard to this theme, essentially 
because reforms have fostered space for reform in concentrated entities. Reform 
designs frequently focus on bolstering capacity in budget departments, forecasting 
units, revenue agencies and treasuries, for example, and connecting personnel from 
these entities to peers in other governments (through training visits, for example). 
Other initiatives also create space. Sierra Leone’s PFM-PR identifies one of its 2007 
reform achievements as the appointment of a qualified Accountant General (AG). The 
appointment is important not just because of the AG’s qualification but also because 
of his appreciation—of the norms implied in recent PFM reforms—and the role he 
can play in building acceptance for new laws. His presence enriches the ‘soil’ in the 
AG Office, creating space for implementation of reform elements. 
122.  Box 6 argued that more advanced PFM systems like those in the United States 
developed along paths, within specific soil. The box presented a broad social 
perspective on what such ‘soil’ involves, but change management literature has 
equivalent ideas at the organizational level. Figure 33 shows a basic approach 
emerging from such literature, which emphasizes the importance of acceptance, 
authority and ability to create reform space.
52  
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Fig. 33. The idea of reform ‘space’ and critical questions to ask of a reform setting 
Is there acceptance: 
Of the need for change and reform? 
Of the specific reform idea? 
Of the monetary costs for reform? 
Of the social costs for reformers? 
Within the incentive structure of the organization? 
Is there authority: 
Does legislation allow people to challenge the status quo 
and initiate reform? 
Do formal organizational structures, rules, allow 
reformers to do what is needed? 
Do informal organizational norms allow reformers to do 
what needs to be done?  
Is there ability: 
Are there enough people, with appropriate skills, to 
conceptualize and implement the reform? 
Are there appropriate information sources (to help 
conceptualize, plan, implement and institutionalize the 
reform)?  
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123.  The basic idea in Figure 33 is that new ideas are only effectively adopted in 
organizations when the ideas are accepted, informal and formal mechanisms 
authorize these ideas, and organizational members are enabled to implement the 
ideas. The three must intersect to create space for reform, and the size of this space 
determines the extent of reform that is possible. The space can be created through 
isomorphic pressures—as in concentrated entities—but is mostly the product of 
internal management structure and engagement. This simple approach merges much 
of the organizational change literature, and can be used to explain why reforms often 
fail to institutionalize themselves, becoming de facto influences on behavior. The 
explanation requires thinking about the kind of space needed at different stages of a 
change process. The stages are: Conceptualization (where reform need is established 
and reform ideas are formalized); Initiation (where reforms are introduced into the 
setting); Transition (where new processes and rules start to replace old, pre-existing 
processes, rules, etc.); and Institutionalization (where reform processes, rules, and 
such are established as formal and social norms, driving behavior). 
124.  The argument is that necessary combinations of authority, acceptance and 
ability are different for different stages of reform. Reform space is often required in 
only concentrated actor groups in early conceptualization and initiation stages, for 
example, where laws and processes are developed (and sometimes piloted). This is in 
many senses where many African countries are with their PFM reforms. The 
challenge to create ‘space’ for transition and institutionalization is very much the 
problem countries face in trying to translate de jure interventions into de facto 
practice. It is also a challenge complicated by the need to engage with multiple, de-
concentrated sets of actors and one that cannot be met through common isomorphic 
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influences. The technical, normative, coercive and even mimetic influences that have 
accommodated conceptualization and initiation are too concentrated and focused on 
peripheral issues. They do not adjust the core issues centered on acceptance of values, 
ways of engaging and relating. Many reforms falter at this stage as a result. 
125.  Given this kind of experience, much organizational change literature 
emphasizes the importance of creating space for organizational creativity and 
innovation rather than simply reforming technical issues. The space is intended to 
accommodate organizational learning, innovation, problem identification and 
problem solving, as well as open windows for appropriate external influence 
(constructive isomorphism, perhaps). This is like enriching soil instead of trying to 
establish a plant that may or may not grow. Or perhaps like instigating change in the 
core mission-values of an organization before changing its peripheral structures.  
126.  There is some evidence of this kind of engagement in various recent PFM 
reform initiatives in Africa, ostensibly introduced to develop a culture conducive to 
implementing new laws. Tanzania’s Accountability, Transparency and Integrity 
Project has an interesting component focused on strengthening oversight and 
watchdog institutions (OWIS), for example, which seeks to work with CSOs and 
professional organizations (like accounting entities) to develop and promote norms 
and ethics considered vital for acceptance of new PFM approaches. Mozambique has 
a project similarly focused on building the accounting profession, and Ethiopia is also 
looking into this issue. Country 11’s Ministry of Economy and Finance has recently 
taken steps to create a professional accounting entity as well, and Ghana is 
considering developing a public sector financial management professional 
association, which could improve reach (to de-concentrated entities) and help build 
acceptance, authority and ability to institutionalize new laws. 
127.  Such reform dimensions are still marginal in even these countries, but could 
be vital to facilitating more de facto reform success—by expanding the space for 
reform. Another approach to achieving greater reform space involves strengthening 
internal institutional pressures for reform. An interesting study by Ashworth, Boyne 
and Delbridge found that the externally-imposed Best Value regime led to many de 
facto changes to English local governments because the technical interventions were 
matched with aggressive and hands-on engagement. Those driving the reform 
“deployed teams of inspectors to undertake “site visits” in order to check compliance” 
which placed “extra pressures on authorities to alter their culture and strategy [and] 
were believed to be most likely to deliver better results.”
  54 The active engagement 
implied in a “site visit” approach to reform offers a vehicle reformers can use to try 
and create ‘space’ for transition and institutionalization of reform. This is a very 
demanding and time consuming approach, but one whereby de-concentrated entities 
have an opportunity to learn about the mission behind reform and its potential value 
to them, and reform leaders can coach others to implement. It could have similar 
results as an initiative to build norms through professional associations.  
                                                 
54 Ashworth, R., G.Boyne and R. Delbridge. 2007. Escape from the Iron Cage? Organizational Change and 
Isomorphic Pressures in the Public Sector. Journal of Public Administration, Research and Theory 
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128.  Either intervention could also be instigated by a variety of agents, including 
government and CSOs. Indeed, where CSOs value the kind of reforms pioneered by 
concentrated entities like treasuries and budget departments, but are concerned that 
these reforms are having limited de facto effect, the CSOs themselves might engage 
in “site visits”—assuming, of course, that CSOs have the ‘right stuff’ to do this 
(appropriate ‘space’ themselves)—an issue discussed in Box 7. Without someone 
playing this kind of role and facilitating some changes to the narrow de jure, 
concentrated reform model, it is likely that reforms will continue to have only limited 
impacts on practice.    
 
 
 
 
 
Even the most legitimate and well-intentioned CSOs struggle to play a role in PFM systems that are 
closed and non-transparent. Transparency and legal access are thus also elements of ‘the right stuff’ 
CSOs need to help develop space for PFM reforms. 
But even with this legitimacy, we are reminded that CSO engagement is indeed limited by government 
PFM itself. A recent set of work by the Open Budget Initiative (OBI) argues that CSOs, no matter what 
their abilities, cannot get anywhere without transparency in governance. It is important to note that the 
OBI finds greater transparency in the PFM upstream and—mirroring discussion in earlier boxes—says 
that CSO engagement is also strongest here.  Poor processes and transparency in the downstream is 
correlated with limited CSO engagement in this domain. 
One has to ask if, given their own shortcomings, these kinds of CSOs have the right stuff to contribute 
to initiatives aimed at building social space for governance reform in government? Box 5 discussed an 
initiative in Mozambique aimed at ensuring they do. The FDC in Mozambique is working with CSOs 
to enhance the quality of financial systems, appreciation for transparency and overall organizational 
legitimacy sought to promote access to information as an independent right. This kind of work can go a 
long way to ensuring CSOs have legitimacy to do the work ahead. 
One answer focuses on the CSOs themselves, and can be illustrated with reference to a recent survey of 
NGOs in Uganda, which found many CSOs falling below good practice in their own governance 
structures.
1  The NGO sector was found to be funded primarily by international non-governmental 
organizations and bilateral donors (Are they themselves domains of concentrated isomorphism?);  Most 
NGOs were small and underfunded and focused on raising awareness and advocacy (often related to 
fund raising) rather than more complex issues of governance (Do they have the ability to engage with 
greater complexity?); Many NGOs were found not to file income tax returns, and few respondents were 
able to provide coherent financial accounts (Do NGOs appreciate the PFM norms and approaches. 
Box 7-  Do CSOs have ‘the right stuff’ to help develop space for new PFM reforms?  
 
Various boxes in this paper have suggested that CSOs have an important role to play in shaping and 
pressuring PFM reform agendas in Africa. What do CSOs need to do this work? 
Direction 2.   Reforms need less concentration, more coverage 
129.  Earlier examples showed that ‘space’ has been developed in many 
concentrated entities already, including central treasuries, budget departments, debt 
units and such all across Africa. This is arguably a major reason why ‘concentrated’ 
PEFA dimensions have higher averages than others. Active donor engagements in 
these areas have played a role in building this space, whether through IMF 
connections to debt units or World Bank relationships with budget departments. 
These relationships allow opportunities for learning, resourcing and other support 
vital to the isomorphic transfer of management approaches.   62
130.  As argued, opportunities for such transfer appear more limited in de-
concentrated entities, partly because the ‘PFM reform engagement’ seldom extends to 
finance officers in Ministries of Agriculture, district offices or procurement officers in 
independent agencies. These entities are usually seen as consumers of the decisions 
taken by central, concentrated actors (like treasuries and budget departments). In a 
sense they are subjects of monologic demands rather than participants in dialogic 
communications, where the former involves being told what to do and the latter 
involves a process of  “problem solving informed by multiple or dialectical 
perspectives.”
55 Effective change generally requires the latter kind of dialogic 
engagement, however, considered appropriate for the design of “public policy 
measures that can then find willing compliance and enforcement.”
56 Involving de-
concentrated entities in dialogic communication creates ‘space’ for reform in these 
entities. 
131.  PFM reforms that address future challenges must be less concentrated and 
facilitate more coverage, or reach, to create space for reform implementation in these 
de-concentrated entities. Interestingly, there are a number of opportunities for such 
expanded coverage in the current experience of the 31 countries. In Mozambique, for 
example, projects that have PFM dimensions are being pursued in various areas—
agriculture, district development, health, education and so forth—and foster relational 
links between external agents and de-concentrated players. The financial management 
approaches embedded in engagements ranging form Global Fund grant activities to 
World Bank projects emphasize similar values and even mechanisms—transparency, 
monitoring and evaluation, reporting, and such, for example. They are vehicles of 
influence that could facilitate enhanced coverage of the PFM agenda.  
132.  The rub-off from non-PFM sectoral projects on the quality of PFM systems is 
evident already in the fact that various countries score high on the PEFA PI-12.iii 
strategic planning dimension because of plans developed in past health and education 
projects. Given that the sectors often account for significant shares of expenditure, the 
existence of costed strategies developed as part of broader projects (or even in PRSP 
creation, as in Mozambique) allows a high PEFA score! Connections between these 
various engagements might accommodate expanded reach in the PFM reform agenda. 
Concentrated entities at the center (like budget departments) could engage with those 
involved in projects at the MDA level, who could engage with projects at the district 
level, who could engage even beyond. The web of engagements suggests a network 
of nodes and ties, where concentrated entities do not always engage directly with de-
concentrated entities, but have pathways of connection through other players. As 
such, one could imagine a mixture of strong and weak tie relationships fostering 
localized learning and experiment (suited to weak ties) as well as “site visit” type 
forced replication (suited to strong ties).
57 The mix of connections will allow 
expanded coverage and accommodate improved ‘reform space’ in the PFM domain. 
                                                 
55 Singh, J.P. 2008. Dialogues as Communication Strategy in Governance Reform. In Odugbemia, S. and T. 
Jacobson (Eds) Governance Reform Under Real World Conditions. World Bank: Washington, D.C, 69. 
56 Ibid. 
57 The strong and weak tie was introduced by Mark Granovetter in 1973. The idea is simply that some 
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133.  The challenge to coordinate and bridge concentrated and de-concentrated 
entities is a new one for many leading PFM entities, however. It is a role that requires 
some flexibility in the reform agenda—and a willingness to engage on creative ideas 
that de-concentrated entities feel might suite them better than standardized solutions. 
It also requires creating mechanisms for inter-organizational communication that do 
not appear extensive in any African countries. CSOs can be an important role player 
in bridging groups in this engagement. Box 3 earlier argued that CSOs can help reach 
de-concentrated actors, citing examples of Lesotho’s Chartered Institute of Public 
Finance and Accountancy in trying to expend ‘reach’ amongst government 
accountants, for example, and the Ugandan Debt Network’s initiatives to connect 
CSOs together with each other and with relevant government entities—facilitating 
dialog, learning and support and advocacy relationships. CSOs often have significant 
social reach, especially when they themselves are subject to some kind of umbrella 
coordination (like in Mozambique, Burkina Faso and Uganda). These CSOs can 
introduce new ideas into the PFM debate themselves, through modern financial 
management methods that they then discuss with governments. CSOs can hold these 
discussions simultaneously with national, district and local governments, and ensure 
that the various conversations are shared. In so doing, they could allow expanded 
coverage of ideas and be domestic vehicles of innovation transfer. Once again, 
however, they need to be well positioned to do so and have ‘the right stuff’ discussed 
in Box 7—transparent and accountable financial management systems, legitimacy 
and relational connectedness.  
Direction 3.  Reforms need less similarity, more context-appropriateness 
134.  Broadening the reform dialog should enhance the creativity of such. It also 
allows greater context-appropriateness in the reform design. Reforms need less 
similarity and more context-appropriateness. The observed similarity in reform 
agendas in the 31 countries analyzed in this research contrasts severely with the 
different country contexts also discussed. It is self evident that league 5 countries do 
not have the same governing or PFM challenges as those in league 1. It is also 
arguable, therefore, that current reform models lack the specificity required for 
meeting either set of challenges. It is interesting to note that, while the current reform 
model ostensibly draws from experience in more developed countries’ ‘good 
international practice’, these countries are actually not as convergent on these 
practices as one might expect.  
135.  OECD countries differ in the degree of adoption in almost every PFM area 
discussed here, including multi-year budgeting, moves towards more strategic 
classifications, use of budget ceilings and rules, cash and accrual accounting 
practices, internal audit, and legislative engagement. One should also note in-country 
variation in these settings (Ministries of Defense often have different systems to 
others) and the fact that systems looked very different in most settings even fifteen 
                                                                                                                                                 
weak ties for others. Weak tie relationships can be more creative than strong tie relationships, for instance, 
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years ago, and definitely 30 years ago.
58 Variation in PFM dimensions is the norm, 
not the exception, it seems. It also seems that the reform approach taken in Africa 
recommends a degree of similarity across these countries not observed in other 
country groups. Research into these other groups suggests systems and reforms to 
systems vary with context. In short, “Context is important”. 
136.  One is reminded of the 5 leagues identified earlier and the finding that top 
league 5 countries score more than a PEFA symbol higher than bottom league 1 
countries for many dimensions and for fiscal outcomes. League 1 and league 5 
countries have different contextual features—levels of economic growth, political 
stability, and such. It is suggested that these different country groups have different 
types of PFM problems requiring different solutions. These different solutions will 
not only be technically different (some countries need a strong annual budget only, 
perhaps, whereas others urgently need a multi-year one) but will also involve 
different things from different sets of role players, different sequencing and different 
types of external engagement. Earlier figures illustrate how the different leagues are 
performing on four types of PFM dimensions. There are various ways one could think 
about shaping reforms to contextually reflect the information in these figures. League 
5 countries are scoring quite well in de jure and concentrated dimension areas, but 
less well in de facto, de-concentrated dimensions. Perhaps there should be less focus 
on creating or even improving law in these contexts and more on implementation, 
especially in MDAs and other de-concentrated entities? League 1 countries score 
below 2 for the quality of legal processes (both de jure measures). Many would 
emphasize bolstering law as a first reform step and strengthening central entities to 
control the system. But consider that these countries tend to lack legal processes and 
have limited capacity; perhaps some de facto interventions focused on specific 
domestic problems (like service provision) would ensure better use of limited 
capacity?  
137.  This paper cannot advise on exact approaches different countries could take to 
ensure reforms match context, but the above discussion notes that this should be 
done. It should yield reform packages that are significantly different to those adopted 
currently. These packages might reflect the kinds of factors literature increasingly 
finds influence government structures, and which even this brief discussion suggests 
matter in the African case. These include: Legal culture (are laws really the vehicle of 
social influence?); Economic challenges (do governments face special costs, revenue 
or expenditure issues that demand more flexibility than control?); Strength of the 
political system (and of actors in this, which influence control designs, paths of 
accountability); Broader cultural and economic development (Are financial 
management norms in place in society, to support their introduction in government). 
Other factors emerge from literatures on contingency in the implementation of 
Management Control Systems, public financial management reform in the OECD, 
                                                 
58 The emphasis here is on choices being made to shape PFM systems.  “History tells us that such ‘choices’ 
change as contexts change—NASA’s early space program successes, arguably a major highlight in 
twentieth century administrative achievement, were born out of considerably less transparency and ‘best 
practice’ competitive procurement than its more recent (though less remarkable) endeavors, for example.” 
See Andrews, M. (2008) Good Government Means Different Things to Different Countries. Paper 
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and other settings.
59 Considering these factors in Africa’s PFM context could 
materially improve the ‘fit’ and impact of reforms.  
138.  Most important of all the factors around which to fit the agenda, however, is 
the problem requiring fixing. Instead of focusing incessantly on achieving external 
legitimacy, governments should attend to where PFM systems need strengthening for 
better service delivery, macroeconomic stabilization, allocation, and such and pursue 
reforms relevant to the domestic problem. This approach will likely allow greater 
contextual application, reach and space. 
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V.  Conclusion 
 
139.  This paper intended to provide a stylized picture of African PFM, addressing 
questions like: How strong has African PFM become? In what ways do African PFM 
systems in place now facilitate effective public financial management? Where are the 
next challenges and how can they be met? It sought to address these questions in a 
fairly general manner, identifying what might be considered the central themes of the 
continent’s recent PFM story. The themes were also used to examine the role of Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs) in African PFM: How much have CSO’s been a part of 
the main story lines to date? Where could they occupy the story more in future? 
140.  Themes arise from the analysis of recent quantitative and qualitative data on 
PFM system characteristics and reform initiatives in 31 African governments, 
emerging in three main parts focused first on themes identified across PFM processes, 
second on themes across countries, and third on themes across reforms. Discussing 
these themes leads to identification of current and future challenges to African PFM. 
141.  Three themes are first identified in looking across the many process areas in 
African PFM systems: (i) Budgets are made better than they are executed; (ii) 
Practice lags behind the creation of processes and laws; and (iii) Actor concentration 
pays. The first theme relates the observation that budget preparation processes are 
comparatively stronger than budget execution and oversight processes across all 
African countries. In PFM jargon, this is commonly presented as ‘upstream processes 
are stronger than downstream processes’. The second theme is more nuanced, 
showing across all process areas that African PFM systems suffer from an 
implementation deficit—laws and processes seldom affect behavior. The third theme 
offers suggests that processes are stronger when concentrated sets of actors are 
involved. Processes are weaker where they involve multiple players, especially 
outside of central PFM entities like the budget department, treasury or debt agency. 
142.  These themes capture general differences in dimension strengths. There is 
substantial variation in dimension strength and process quality between countries, 
however. The variation is significant enough to suggest that different countries fall 
into different ‘PFM performance leagues’. These leagues are identified empirically, 
based on PEFA scores, and are also reflected in major inter-league differences in 
PFM process and outcome performance. Lower league countries have weak 
dimensions no matter how these are categorized; de jure and de facto are weak, as are 
concentrated and de-concentrated dimensions, as are upstream and downstream. 
League 3 countries share weak downstream, de facto and de-concentrated dimensions 
with lower league countries; but league 3 countries are strengthening PFM 
dimensions that are in the upstream, de jure in nature, and centered on the 
engagement of concentrated actor sets. League 5 countries share strengthened 
upstream, de jure and concentrated PFM areas with league 3; but these countries 
appear to be strengthening the other dimensions—downstream, de facto and de-
concentrated—their current challenges. 
143.  Themes also arise in explaining why countries fall into different leagues. A 
range of factors are seen to influence the quality of PFM systems and outcomes,   67
presented as five major themes: Growing economies have stronger PFM; Stability 
delivers PFM progress; Fiscal states have stronger PFM systems; Longer periods of 
broad reform commitment foster PFM progress; and, Colonial heritage matters 
(maybe). It is apparent that these themes interlink and that there may be an as yet 
unidentified factor underlying them all. Even without identifying such factor, 
however, the section suggests a basic message: Country characteristics matter a great 
deal in understanding what PFM system quality looks like. The message raises 
important questions, chief being, “Is context taken seriously in reform design?” 
144.  The final section addresses this and other questions pertaining to PFM reform 
experience across Africa. The main theme identified centers on the apparent 
similarities in reform models across the 31 countries. The theme is reflected in the 
observation that similarities belie country differences. The ‘similar’ model is 
composed of a set of international reform ‘products’ and follows a common modality 
of engagement whereby central, concentrated entities like treasuries, budget 
departments and even revenue and procurement agencies are strengthened and laws 
and processes are modified. This reform approach is seen to deliver better law and 
stronger central agencies, but may be limited to these gains only. The paper proposes 
adjustments needed to meet looming challenges embodied in calls for less focus on 
technicalities, more on ‘space’, less concentration and more coverage, and less 
similarity, but more context-appropriateness. 
A.  Summing up thoughts on CSOs and PFM in Africa 
145.  The paper consistently explores the potential for CSO engagement in Africa’s 
future PFM story and evidence of its existing role. It finds many opportunities exist, 
in context of the ‘gaps’ implied in themes, and in many cases CSOs already fill these 
gaps. It does argue that CSOs face their own challenges in engagement, however, 
with serious questions about how CSOs ensure they have the ‘right stuff’ for 
engagement. Opportunities for CSO engagement are identified in the relative 
weakness of downstream PFM processes. CSOs have significant room to move in 
situations where laws allow and even require practices that governments are not 
acting on. Finally, the lack of PFM reach to de-concentrated entities also plays into 
potential CSO strengths to convene and connect over organizational bridges in ways 
that many other role players cannot. The themes emphasizing country context and 
about reform experience suggest a number of challenges for CSOs. One expects CSO 
roles to differ depending on country context—with different opportunities in higher 
growth countries than may arise in post conflict settings, for example. CSOs will need 
to develop the acumen to choose appropriate roles for the different settings, working 
as partners in some instances, introducing new ideas in others, and occupying 
adversarial corners in others. It is vital that CSOs not become agents of one-best-way 
models of engagement, reflective of PFM reform modalities. CSOs could play a role 
challenging these reform modalities, contributing to creative space, facilitating 
greater reach, and helping to shape interventions to context. CSOs need legitimacy to 
do this, reflected most basically in having their own financial management ‘house in 
order’. CSOs also need basic access to do this, and will be constrained by weaknesses 
in transparency of PFM in general. If CSOs do not have the ‘right stuff’ of legitimacy 
and access they will be marginalized in the PFM story. 